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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently in Nebraska the following notice appeared in supermar-
kets and other businesses and even in the Lancaster County County-
City Building:
EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY
NOTICE
Anyone who writes a bad c ..
in LINCOLN will be required to:
ATTEND AN PAY A AND
8 HOUR $35.00 MAKE
BAD CHECK FEE, RESTITUTION,
CLASS I or
BE SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL CHARGES.
NO EXCEPTIONS!
The notice, available at the office of the county attorney and distrib-
uted by his authority,' obviously is designed as an attention grabber.
And in attention grabbing it obviously is a success. In all other re-
spects, however, the notice represents law enforcement policy failure.
The clear import of the notice-that the simple, inadvertent bounc-
ing of a check is a criminal act in Nebraska-not only misdescribes the
Nebraska bad check offense,2 it describes an unconstitutional version
1. The notice reproduced in text is a copy of one obtained at the office of the Lancas-
ter County County Attorney. It is printed and distributed by authority of the
county attorney. Telephone interview with Joseph Kelly, Deputy Lancaster
County Attorney (Sept. 3, 1985), recorded in memo from L. Hardy to J.R. Potuto
(Sept. 4, 1985) (on file in R. 210 at U. Neb. Law College) [hereinafter cited as Bad
Check Memo No. 1].
2. A bad check is one used in lieu of cash that is drawn on a closed or nonexistent
account or on an account containing insufficient funds to permit payment in full.
A check writer uses a nonexistent account when, for example, he uses a counter
check (at one time commonly provided in rural stores, the counter check had
printed on it the name of the bank on which the check would be written but was
otherwise blank). See F. BEUTEL, STUDY OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE BAD-
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of the offense. The notice's wide use and glaring inaccuracy, more-
over, suggests county attorney delinquency in assuring accurate dis-
semination (or at least preventing inaccurate dissemination) of
information about the Nebraska criminal law.3 Worse yet in terms of
county attorney law enforcement responsibility, the notice suggests
unwise, in some ways probably illegal, and possibly even unconstitu-
tional program operation. 4
Since bad check programs much like this one increasingly are a
coming national phenomenon,5 I decided to look into the description
CHECK LAWS IN NEBRASKA 256, 277 (1957). In Nebraska the bad check offense
also requires that the check be exchanged for property, services, or other value
present at the time of the exchange. NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-611 (Supp. 1985). For
the mens rea required to be convicted of a bad check offense in Nebraska, see
infra text accompanying notes 23-26.
3. For a discussion of the county attorney's role in information dissemination, see
infra note 91 and accompanying text.
4. Although I believe that the county attorney is responsible for and must revise
both the notice and his office enforcement policy, I certainly do not believe that
present practice represents a deliberate or willful decision to circumvent the Ne-
braska criminal law. In fact, I was assisted considerably in understanding and
reviewing the program by staff at both pretrial diversion and the County Attor-
ney's office in Lancaster County. Of particular assistance was Joseph Kelly, Dep-
uty County Attorney.
The Lancaster County Bad Check Program is patterned upon a model devel-
oped by the National Corrective Training Institute and already used in more than
400 locations. The Journalist (U. Neb. School of Journalism), Nov. 28, 1984, at 2,
col. 1. The class and program were probably instituted in Lancaster County in a
well-meaning attempt to aid merchants, rehabilitate bad check passers, and free
county attorney time to pursue other crimes and criminals. For a discussion of
merchant pressures on local law enforcement officers to assist in bad check col-
lection, see F. BEUTEL, supra note 2, at 286-93. In instituting the program here,
however, insufficient attention was paid to underlying policy and program impli-
cations, or to the effect on the program of Nebraska constitutional and statutory
law.
5. See Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1985, at 19, col. 3; The Journalist (U. Neb. School of Jour-
nalism), Nov. 28, 1984, at 2, col. 1; telephone interview with E. McMasters, direc-
tor of the Lancaster County Pretrial Diversion Bad Check Program (June 17,
1985), recorded in memo from L. Hardy to J.R. Potuto (July 12, 1985) (on file in
R. 210 at U. Neb. College of Law) [hereinafter cited as Bad Check Memo No. 2].
The popularity and perceived success of these programs led the Nebraska Uni-
cameral to consider specific statutory authority for program creation. LB 445, § 3,
89th Leg., 1st Sess. (1985). The provision was rejected in committee. Hearing on
LB 445 Before the Comm. on Judiciary, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Hearing on LB 445]. Counties still are free to adopt, as Lancaster County
already has, a bad check program as an aspect of pretrial diversion. See infra text
accompanying notes 56-58. The reason for committee rejection of specific statu-
tory authorization apparently was four-fold. Three concerns related to underly-
ing policy: (1) concern that the program made the county attorney the
merchant's civil debt collector; (2) concern that this debt collection assistance
only encouraged bad check-cashing practice by merchants; and (3) concern that
indigents would be precluded from program participation because of inability to
pay the class fee. The final concern related to the appropriateness of the legisla-
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and operation of this Nebraska program to determine where and how
it has gone wrong and whether and how to correct it. Inevitably this
inquiry progressed further: first, to an examination and evaluation of
the current Nebraska bad check statute and its judicial interpretation;
then to an examination and evaluation of the appropriate definitional
scope of a bad check offense and the policy concerns that should be
reflected in law enforcement practice regarding it; and, finally, to the
conclusion that too often the bad check offense perverts the legitimate
use of the criminal justice system by transforming it into a civil debt
collector. This Article results.
II. THE BAD CHECK PROGRAM: WHY HAVE ONE?
The effect of participation in the bad check program (as well, evi-
dently, as the effect of the merchant's notice) is reported to be a reduc-
tion in the number of bad checks passed and an increase in the
number of collections.6 This reported positive record in controlling
bad check writing and remedying its consequences obviously is popu-
lar with those merchants who know of the program and believe it is
saving them money. Another advantage to merchants-one that goes
unstated by those touting program merits-is the financial benefit de-
rived from the state's active participation in and subsidization of
merchant debt collection activities.7
From the viewpoint of bad check writers the program similarly is
advanced as a boon. The thirty-five dollar fee charged a program par-
ticipant is claimed to cost that person less than it would to defend
against a criminal prosecution.8 Program participation provides more
tive role since the legislature would be encouraging, but not funding, these pro-
grams. Heawing on LB 445, supra; telephone interview with J. Owens, legal
assistant, Unicameral Judiciary Comm. (Nov. 14, 1985). That the first three pol-
icy concerns were well founded is amply borne out by the Lancaster County
practice.
6. The Journalist (U. Neb. School of Journalism), Nov. 28, 1984, at 2, col. 1; North-
east Lincoln Sun, Nov. 13, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
7. See infra note 112 for a description of the magnitude of the savings. Not only do
collection costs "probably equal or exceed" the cost of running sheriff and county
attorney offices, but sheriffs and county attorneys would earn "much more than
their salaries, if paid at commercial collection agency rates . F. BEUTEL,
supra note 2, at 293.
8. The Journalist (U. Neb. School of Journalism), Nov. 28, 1984, at 2, col. 1. Costs
and charges (exclusive of restitution costs) are less expensive to a bad check
passer if measured against a successful prosecution because court fees may be
assessed only against convicted bad check passers. When measured against other
potential case resolutions, savings to a bad check passer are not so clear. Even in
the absence of a bad check program, court fees still are avoided whenever a bad
check case is resolved pretrial, whether by plea, plea bargain, or county attorney
dismissal. In such a pretrial resolution the bad check passer also avoids the $35
program cost. Trial and acquittal, moreover, obviously avoid all costs, including
restitution. And program participation theoretically could be more expensive
1986]
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than monetary benefit: it permits a bad check passer to avoid the
stigma of a criminal prosecution and possible conviction, as well as the
consequences, both direct and collateral, attendant on conviction.9
The program also seems to provide something for the rest of us-
those who in the normal course of things expect neither to receive nor
pass bad checks. Assuming the criminal treatment of the bad check
offense remains a constant,10 then within that criminal treatment a
successful bad check program might result in tax dollars saved.
Where bad check writing is reduced, so too are taxpayer criminal in-
vestigative costs; where prosecution is avoided, so too are taxpayer
prosecution-associated costs. In a perfect world, moreover, reductions
in merchant bad check losses should be matched by lower prices
charged consumers. And for all these benefits, the program appar-
ently not only costs the taxpayer nothing, it may even generate net
profits to an offering county.11
The program appears to provide an efficient way to decrease the
incidence of bad checks passed. But, with apologies for the hyperbole,
so would electrocution of all bad check passers. Taking for granted
that all the program benefits claimed are actual and not merely only
logically anticipated,12 at least two issues remain regarding the opera-
than even a conviction. Although not specifically required by statute, successful
check program completion requires making restitution. Upon trial and convic-
tion, however, restitution orders are discretionary with the trial judge. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-611(6) (Supp. 1985). For a discussion of the likelihood of restitution
being ordered, see infra text accompanying notes 152-55.
Bad check program participation doubtless is less expensive than prosecution
to any bad check passer who retains, and pays, private counsel to defend him.
Lawyer costs, if the bad check passer does not qualify for public defender assist-
ance, certainly would make the bad check class the less expensive alternative.
9. Direct consequences of a prosecution and conviction are the criminal trial and
actual sentence. Collateral consequences are the civil consequences that adhere
through statute, constitutional provision, case law, or practice. These might in-
clude public license disqualification, restriction on voting rights, and employment
discrimination. See generally Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of A
Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970).
10. Incurring of investigation, prosecution, court, probation department, and correc-
tional costs obviously depends on the definitional scope of the offense and county
enforcement policy. If the offense is defined narrowly there will be fewer in-
stances of its commission and presumably concomittantly lower criminal justice
costs. Lower costs will result whether or not there is a bad check program.
11. See Bad Check Memo No. 2, supra note 5. Whether the financial benefit to
merchants can justify heavy taxpayer costs necessary for full law enforcement
involvement in bad check cases (including investigation and informal resolution
as well as prosecution, court, and correctional costs) is, to put it mildly, more
problematic. That taxpayer costs can be heavy is clear. See F. BEUTEL, supra
note 2, at 345-49. That strict laws, heavy penalties, and even concerted enforce-
ment may have little effect on recidivism also is clear. Id. at 349-58.
12. See F. BEUTEL, supra note 2, at 349-78 for a discussion of how, in some respects at
least, logically anticipated results of a bad check enforcement policy do not prove
out empirically.
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tion of such a program. First, is the program as described in the notice
(or as repackaged) constitutional? Second, is efficiency enough to jus-
tify a coercive thrust by the criminal justice system into what other-
wise often would be a purely private commercial transaction,
particularly if, as here, the injured party has other options available to
prevent and collect on bad checks?
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY AND LEGAL SCOPE OF THE BAD
CHECK STATUTE AND PROGRAM UNDER THE
NEBRASKA CONSTITUTION
A. The Statute
The statute that makes criminal the passing of a bad check de-
scribes a person guilty of the offense as one who:
obtains property, services, or present value of any kind by issuing or passing a
check or similar signed order for the payment of money, knowing that he or
she has no account with the drawee at the time the check or order is issued, or,
if he or she has such an account, knowing that he or she does not have suffi-
cient funds in, or credit with, the drawee for the payment of such check or
order in full upon its presentation .... 13
While it is a truism-and perhaps no truer legal truism exists-that
statutory language is often ambiguous or subject to different interpre-
tations,14 nonetheless the Nebraska bad check statutory language is
13. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-611 (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). Although this statute
has an effective date of Sept. 6, 1985, the language quoted remains unchanged
from its original adoption in the criminal code revision. See id. at § 28-611. The
statutory language is interesting since it reads as if passing a check with knowl-
edge of account insufficiency is an offense even if there are funds in the account
at the time it is presented for payment. Obviously that was not the legislative
intent. A crime requires the temporal matching of the evil-thinking mind (mens
rea) and the evil-doing hand (actus reus). See generally 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES * 21; 2 J.F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
78 (1883). Obviously, too, in the normal run of cases no one will be prosecuted for
the bad knowledge if the check actually is honored. Suppose, however, a person
with $50 in his account cashes two $50 checks, check A on Monday and check B
on Tuesday. When passing check A he knows he has sufficient funds to cover; he
passes check B with bad knowledge. What happens if check B is presented and
paid by the bank before check A arrives? For check A his knowledge was pure:
there were, indeed, sufficient funds in the account. For check B he had bad
knowledge, but the check turned out to be paid. The hypothetical does not repre-
sent mere professorial sophistry since defendant's claims regarding his knowl-
edge when passing the checks may be proved out by comparing check passing and
check presentation dates on the two checks. Technically he may have committed
no crime.
14. See generally Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395
(1950); Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv. 407
(1950). For a tongue-in-cheek example of statutory interpretation turning statu-
tory language on its head, see 8 CRIm. L. Q. 137 (1965) (Small Birds Act construed
to apply to pony with down pillow on its back).
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remarkably clear at least on one point: the bad check offense requires
more than simply writing a check that bounces. By express statutory
terms the offense of passing a bad check is committed only when a
person passes a bad check knowing at the time that he has no account
or has insufficient funds in the account to cover the check.
Thus the merchant's notice set forth above, in claiming that any-
one writing a bad check must participate in the bad check program or
be subject to criminal charges, clearly and unequivocably contradicts
the language of the statute. That the notice derives no support from
judicial interpretation of the statute also is clear. In fact, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court not only has not undercut the clear thrust of
the knowledge requirement in the statute, it has upheld its constitu-
tionality under Nebraska law by construing the bad check offense lan-
guage to require a specific intent to defraud, obviously a more culpable
state of mind than actual knowledge.' 5 Why, and particularly how, the
Nebraska Supreme Court read the bad check statute to require spe-
cific intent makes an interesting story. First, the why.
1. Why Specific Intent Is Necessary
Article 1, Section 20 of the Nebraska Bill of Rights provides that
"[n]o person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action or mesne
or final process, unless in cases of fraud."6 Although the constitu-
tional language refers to civil, not criminal, actions, the Nebraska
Supreme Court long has held the provision applicable to criminal
prosecutions initiated to aid a civil creditor.17 In State ex rel. Norton v.
Janing,lS the court provided its clearest articulation of the applicabil-
ity to criminal prosecutions of the civil debt imprisonment prohibition.
Norton involved a general contracior who received full payment
for a construction job and then failed to pay his subcontractors for
their work. Although the property owner already had paid Norton in
full, she still was liable to the materialmen for labor and materials and
her property remained subject to a materialmen's lien. Norton was
15. See generally State v. Kock, 207 Neb. 731, 300 N.W.2d 824 (1981); State ex rel.
Norton v. Janing, 182 Neb. 539, 156 N.W.2d 9 (1968).
16. NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 20 (imprisonment for debt prohibited).
17. See, e.g., White v. State, 135 Neb. 154, 158-59, 280 N.W. 433, 435-36 (1938). Ne-
braska is not alone in requiring an intent to defraud to insulate criminal prosecu-
tions from unconstitutionality under a state civil debt imprisonment prohibition.
See, e.g., Tolbert v. State, 294 Ala. 738, 321 So. 2d 227 (1975); State v. Meeks, 30
Ariz. 436, 247 P. 1099 (1926); People v. Vinnola, 177 Colo. 405, 494 P. 2d 826 (1972);
Hollis v. State, 152 Ga. 182, 108 S.E. 783 (1921); State v. Haremza, 213 Kan. 201, 515
P.2d 1217 (1973); Patterson v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 909 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 970 (1978); State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1980);
Colin v. State, 145 Tex. Crirn. 371, 168 S.W.2d 500 (1943); State v. Pilling, 53 Wash.
464, 102 P. 230 (1909); Locklear v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 603, 273 N.W.2d 334 (1979).
18. 182 Neb. 539, 156 N.W.2d 9 (1968).
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arrested under a criminal statute making it unlawful for a general
contractor to take money paid for work done and then fail to pay la-
borers and materialmen.19 As the Norton court correctly noted, the
statute was intended to assist the materialman to obtain money due
him while insulating the property owner from paying twice.20
The legislative motives were laudable. There is no denying, and
certainly the Norton court did not deny, the real harm done to a prop-
erty owner faced with a defaulting contractor on the one side and a
materialmen's lien on the other. But there is also no denying that the
injury caused is through breach of contract.
The issue for the court was whether, consistent with the Nebraska
imprisonment for debt provision, the state could make criminal-ab-
sent proof of fraud-the incurring of and failure to satisfy a civil debt.
The court refused to permit the coercive power of a criminal prosecu-
tion to aid a creditor to obtain payment of a civil debt, absent a show-
ing of fraud, when the creditor constitutionally could not do so.21 The
court quoted with favor a description of the limited nature of the po-
lice power as one that
"cannot be made a cloak under which to overthrow or disregard constitutional
rights.... The payment of debts that may be due laborers or materialmen is
not calculated to conserve the safety, health, or general welfare of the commu-
nity. There can be nothing so injurious to the public welfare in the failure of a
debtor to pay his just debts as to require an exercise of the police power. In all
free governments the good sense of mankind, since the day when imprison-
ment for debt was abolished, has condemned and frowned down any attempt
to coerce the performance of civil obligations by criminal penalties.12 2
The Norton court held, therefore, that proof of fraudulent intent was
necessary to imprison for failure to pay civil obligations. That which is
unconstitutional if attempted directly by the creditor may not be ac-
19. NEB. REV. STAT. § 52-119 (1943) (repealed 1969).
20. State ex rel. Norton v. Janing, 182 Neb. 539, 542, 156 N.W.2d 9, 11 (1968).
21. The court rejected a characterization of the funds paid the contractor as a con-
structive trust for the benefit of the materialmen. Id. at 543-47, 156 N.W.2d at 11-
14. First, the court refused to add language to the statute necessary to reach this
result. See Llewellyn, supra note 14, at 405 (statutory expression of one thing
precludes consideration of another not expressed). The court also rejected crea-
tion of a constructive trust for what I consider a more obviously cogent and com-
pelling reason. To create a trust out of the very relationship of debtor to creditor
without a showing of fraud makes nonsense out of the constitutional prohibition
against making the civil debt itself the basis for imprisonment. State ex. rel. Nor-
ton v. Janing, 182 Neb. 542, 545-47, 156 N.W.2d 9, 12-14 (1968). Finally, the court
appeared to find that a constructive trust would violate the debtor's constitutional
right to contract. Id. at 543, 156 N.W.2d at 11-12. The right-to-contract argument
finds little support in cases construing the contract clause of the Constitution of
the United States. See generally B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CON-
STITUTION (1938); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARV. L.
REV. 512 (1944).
22. State ex rel. Norton v. Janing, 182 Neb. 539, 543-44, 156 N.W.2d 9, 12 (1968) (quot-
ing People v. Holder, 53 Cal. App. 45, 53, 199 P. 832, 835-36 (1921)).
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complished indirectly by the state through its power to define and
prosecute crime.
As early as 1938, in White v. State,23 the Nebraska Supreme Court
referred to the intent to defraud element in the bad check statute in
upholding the statute's constitutionality under the Nebraska Constitu-
tion. The court at that time did not need to consider directly whether
intent to defraud was an essential constitutional element because the
predecessor statute, unlike the present, by its terms required intent to
defraud.2 4 When faced under the present statute with the question
whether intent to defraud is a necessary element of a bad check of-
fense in Nebraska, the court, in State v. Kock, answered in the affirma-
tive.25 The court then upheld the constitutionality of the present
statute, but only after construing the statute to require not merely
actual knowledge, but an intent to defraud.26
2. How the Nebraska Supreme Court Saved the
Bad Check Statute
The court arrived at its construction of the bad check statute to
require specific intent through an interesting but ultimately unpersua-
sive reading of the statute. It saved the statute-an express purpose of
the court 27 -but at the cost of reasoning both intricate and strained.
Since there is no disputing the absence of express intent to defraud
language in the current statute, the Kock court looked to other sec-
tions of the statute to find the requisite mens rea element. Remarka-
bly, it found the missing mens rea of specific intent in an element of
the crime's actus reus, in the fact that a "key element" of the bad
check offense is that the use of the check induced someone to rely to
his detriment by providing goods, services, or other present value in
exchange for the check.28 Since fraud by definition is a deception with
23. 135 Neb. 154, 158-59, 280 N.W. 433, 435-36 (1938).
24. NEB. COMP. STAT. § 28-1212 (1929) (emphasis added), described as guilty of the
offense:
Any person who, with intent to defraud, shall make or draw, or utter, or
deliver, any check, draft, or order for the payment of money, upon any
bank or other depository, knowing at the time of such making, drawing,
uttering or delivering, that the maker, or drawer has not sufficient funds
in, or credit with, such bank or other depository for the payment of such
check, draft or order, in full upon its presentation....
25. State v. Kock, 207 Neb. 731, 733, 300 N.W.2d 824, 825 (1981).
26. Id. at 734-36. Intent to defraud is an element in most bad check statutes. Com-
ment, Insufficient Funds Checks in the Criminal Area. Elements, Issues, and
Proposals, 38 Mo. L. REV. 432, 436 (1973).
27. State v. Kock, 207 Neb. 731, 734, 300 N.W.2d 824, 825 (1981).
28. Id. The Kock court supported its construction that the exchange-for-value re-
quirement of the Nebraska bad check offense demonstrated a legislative purpose
to require specific intent to defraud by contrasting the statute with the Model
Penal Code bad check offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.5 (Proposed Official
[Vol. 65:242
1986] NEBRASKA BAD CHECK OFFENSE
the specific intent to induce surrender of value in reliance on the de-
ception,29 obviously, or so the court suggested, the legislature in em-
ploying exchange-for-value language was describing fraudulent intent.
But the fact of detrimental reliance, or, in other words, the fact
that a "victim" relied on a bad check to part with something of value,
does not by itself show that the check passer acted with specific in-
tent.30 Nor does it demonstrate a legislative purpose, when the legisla-
ture employed the word "knowledge" in the statute, to really mean to
require a specific intent to defraud.
The more likely explanation for the choice of statutory language,
one the court rejects, 31 is that the legislature did not think about 32 or,
having thought, did not realize that a specific intent mens rea constitu-
tionally would be required to uphold the bad check statute. That the
legislature intended a knowledge mens rea amply is demonstrated by
the language of the statute itself. If, after all, the legislature wanted a
specific-intent-to-defraud mens rea it could just as easily have used
specific-intent-as-knowledge language-with the added benefit that
the statute then would have been clear and express on this point.
Draft 1962). The Model Penal Code bad check offense does not require an ex-
change for value; the mens rea required is knowledge. But the Model Penal Code
rejection of exchange-for-value language was expressly to cover items such as
post-dated checks and checks written on pre-existing debts. See infra note 48.
Nowhere did the drafters suggest that excluding an exchange-for-value element
was what permitted them to make knowledge rather than purpose the operative
mens rea of the offense. If anything, the knowledge mens rea relates to the
Model Penal Code characterization of the bad check offense as a misdemeanor.
For a discussion of the relevance of the misdemeanor characterization, see infra
text accompanying notes 124-32.
29. The earliest false pretense statute prohibited obtaining property by false pre-
tenses with intent to defraud. 30 Geo. 2, ch. 24 (1757). See also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 223.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis added): "A person is
guilty of theft if he obtains property of another by deception. A person deceives if
he purposely .. "
"Purpose" under the Model Penal Code is generally equivalent to a specific
intent requirement. "Purpose," defined as "conscious object," not only describes
the mens rea of crimes carrying the heaviest sentencing consequences, but gener-
ally is the mens rea requirement of crimes that at common law and in other codes
require specific intent. The drafters of the Model Penal Code likely would frown,
however, on this easy equation because they purposefully avoided use of intent
language (whether specific or general). See id § 2.02 commentary at 124-25
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Language of specific and general intent has caused
myriad difficulties for courts and commentators. See, e.g., United States v. Stew-
art, 41 C.M.R. 58 (1969); State v. Stasio, 78 N.J. 467, 396 A.2d 1129 (1979).
30. Even more clear, the absence of detrimental reliance certainly does not prove the
actor had no specific intent to defraud. See infra text accompanying notes 41-50.
31. State v. Kock, 207 Neb. 731, 734, 300 N.W.2d 824, 825-26 (1981). The court rejects
this explanation, not because it finds it incorrect, but because it employs a fiction
(or, as the court describes it, a presumption) that the legislature acted with full
knowledge of the court's earlier opinion. Id.
32. This is the explanation I favor.
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Why instead would the legislature, wanting specific intent, elect to
speak indirectly and ambiguously, by coupling "knowledge" with an
exchange for value requirement? Of course a court should read legis-
lation with an assumption of its constitutionality; surely it should also
read both with an assumption of legislative rationality as well as with
a view to upholding the sense and the rhetoric of its own constitu-
tional pronouncements.
If, moreover, the legislature had considered whether specific intent
was required constitutionally, it readily might have concluded that
specific intent was not required. There are states with similar consti-
tutional prohibitions against imprisonment for debt that have upheld
bad check statutes by requiring knowledge and not specific intent as
the mens rea.33 Although these states are in the minority, they none-
theless demonstrate the possibility of reading the constitutional provi-
sion less stringently than did the Kock court.34 More telling than a
review of other states' treatments of imprisonment for debt provi-
sions, it was not all that clear in White v. State that specific intent was
a necessary constitutional requirement in Nebraska. Despite the Kock
court's later characterization of the White v. State opinion,35 the
White court held merely that a specific intent mens rea was sufficient,
not that it was necessary, to save the bad check statute from successful
constitutional challenge.
The Kock court, therefore, in finding that "knowledge" plus an ex-
change for value requirement equals specific intent, was not effecting
a legislative intent,36 but, rather, was upholding the statute despite the
legislative intent. To achieve this result, the court both diluted the
force of the specific intent requirement and confused the mens and
actus reus elements of the offense. That it did so is obvious.
The "property, services, or present value of any kind"37 statutory
33. See, e.g., State v. Berry, 358 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1978); Commonwealth v. Mutnik, 486
Pa. 428, 406 A.2d 516 (1979). The mens rea requirement in the Model Penal Code
bad check statute is "knowledge." MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.5 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962). The offense is, however, a misdemeanor. For a discussion of the
significance of the grading of the offense in terms of mens rea requirement, see
infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
34. My difficulty here is not with the imposition of a specific intent requirement.
Particularly in light of the statutory penalties, I think the Nebraska Supreme
Court is right to require a specific intent mens rea. My quarrel is with the court's
finding that the present statute incorporates a specific intent mens rea.
35. State v. Kock, 207 Neb. 731, 733-34, 300 N.W.2d 824, 825-26 (1981).
36. If, then, the exchange-for-value requirement in the present statute is not a re-
markably roundabout way to say "specific intent," why is it in the statute? In
addition to being theft offense language, the requirement obviously (and, I think,
quite appropriately) narrows the scope of the bad check statute so that, for exam-
ple, a bad check given as a gift is not a crime. For more on this subject, see infra
text accompanying notes 43-53.
37. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-611 (Supp. 1985). The common law definition of larceny
required a taking of the property of another. The modern consolidated theft stat-
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language is language that describes part of the actus reus element of
any theft offense. The common law definition of larceny required a
taking of the property of another; the modern consolidated theft stat-
utes have expanded that definition to include "services" 38 as well as
"anything of value."39 The mens rea element, whether specific intent
or knowledge, has nothing to do with the definiton of the property
stolen.
The traditional theft offense involves a trespass-an unlawful tak-
ing-with specific intent to deprive the owner permanently. Theft by
deception involves a taking by deception, not trespass, again with pur-
pose to deprive permanently. Since there is no trespass, no thief in the
night, no snatch and run, the theft by deception occurs with the
knowledge, and the cooperation, of the victim. A description of the
object of the crime, the "anything of value" that is taken, describes the
property, not the mens rea of the thief.
The Kock court gloss on specific intent not only creates confusion,
it also includes check passers within the scope of the statute who in
fact have no specific intent to defraud. Take, for example, a customer
who goes to a local store and buys a television set. He leaves a cash
deposit; the remainder of the purchase price is to be paid on delivery.
The set is delivered on a Saturday and the customer writes a check for
the balance. He knows when he writes the check that he cannot cover
it, but he intends to deposit funds first thing on Monday to cover the
check.
An hour after the television is delivered, it hisses, emits smoke and
blithely goes dead. The customer calls the store and is told (1) the
store will repair, not replace, and (2) someone will be out to look at
the set no earlier than in approximately ten days. The customer now
decides, as, I assume, many of us would, not to deposit the money nec-
essary to cover the check.40 Leverage well may be the best weapon
this consumer has.
Where an intent to defraud specifically is required by statute to
convict, this customer likely has committed no offense. He had no in-
utes have expanded that definition to include "services" as well as "anything of
value."
38. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 223.0(6) & 223.7 (Proposed Official Draft 1962);
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-509 to 515 (1979).
39. "Anything of value" includes real estate, food and drink, electrical power, and
contract rights. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.0(6) (Proposed Official Draft
1962); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-509 (1979).
40. Contrast this case with one where there were funds in the account at the time the
check was written but the customer directs a stop payment order after the TV set
dies. In this latter case, clearly, he has not committed the bad check offense. Yet
where is the difference in the mens rea? And how can one argue persuasively
that the difference between the two cases is one that warrants a difference in
criminal culpability?
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tent to defraud at the time he passed the check nor, indeed, at the
later time when he decided not to cover the check. Yet, under the
Nebraska statute, he seems to have committed the offense: he had
knowledge of check insufficiency at the time he wrote the check, and
he obtained value41 in exchange.42 Not only is nothing more statuto-
rily required, but the Nebraska Supreme Court had said that this
much, without more, is constitutional.
Take, for another example, the case of someone, call him D, who
owes $100,000 to one P. Suppose P threatens D with suit. Suppose D
then writes a check for $100,000 to P, knowing he has no funds to
cover the check and intending to flee the area before P has time either
to learn the check is bad or to bring suit. It is difficult to see why an
exchange for value (say ten dollars worth of groceries at the super-
market) with knowledge that the check is bad equates to specific in-
tent to defraud and, thus, constitutionally may be prosecuted, when,
by contrast, D's giving P the $100,000 check for payment of his pre-
existing debt-on the facts provided in this hypothetical-shows no
specific intent.
It is likely that the court, faced with these two situations in the
second hypothetical, would find that both the ten dollar and $100,000
check passers had specific intent. The court should go on to find, how-
ever, that the $100,000 check passer has not committed the bad check
offense because there has been no exchange for value. The exchange-
for-value requirement here would be handled as it should be, not as an
aspect of mens rea but as an additional statutory element going to the
actus reus of the crime. Exchange for value, in other words, must be
found even where specific intent independently may be proved.
It is possible that the court might try to find an exchange for value
in the case of the $100,000 check passer. The value received, if not the
$100,000 pre-existing debt itself, could be considered the delay, or for-
bearance, to sue as well as the time gained by D through use of the bad
check.43
The real difficulty with this approach is that such a broad defini-
41. A dead television might not be value in any practical sense but it unquestionably
is value under the bad check statute.
42. To say that exchange of a check for something of value tied to knowledge of
check insufficiency is not specific intent is not to deny that it is evidentiary of an
intent to defraud. Indeed, the two together are compelling evidence of such an
intent. But to say one is compelling evidence of the other is nonetheless not to
say that one is the other.
Specific intent most frequently is proved inferentially. We may show, for ex-
ample, that A had the specific intent to kill by evaluating whether most people,
or most reasonable people, in the circumstances, given what A knew, could or
would have acted as A did without specific intent. The jury question, however,
remains: "Did A have specific intent?"
43. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.0(6) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 28-509 (1979).
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tion of "anything of value" makes nonsense out of the Kock court's
saving of the statute by coupling statutory "knowledge" language with
the statutory exchange-for-value requirement to conclude that specific
intent to defraud (although not stated expressly in the statute) re-
mains an element of the Nebraska bad check offense. It is obvious
that the "anything of value" qualification must have discernible, con-
crete meaning since otherwise the Kock court has transported us to a
Wonderland 44 where words mean only what we choose them to
mean-and here we choose that "knowledge" means the same thing as
"specific intent."
Unfortunately, however, the Nebraska Supreme Court already has
traveled quite a way down the road to Wonderland. In State v. Spauld-
ing,45 the defendant had two accounts. By writing checks back
and forth on these accounts she was able for a time to show credit
balances in both accounts and thereby hide an actual deficit of more
than $1,100. The court found that this apparent account balance was
value for purposes of the bad check statute exchange-for-value
requirement.46
No argument was made to the court that inclusion of such a check
kiting scheme within the exchange-for-value requirement in large
part erodes the Kock court's reliance on the exchange-for-value lan-
guage to translate knowledge into specific intent.47 The Spaulding
court thus never expressly considered the effect on the Kock specific
intent requirement of inclusion of check kiting within the exchange-
for-value language. It is possible, then (although unlikely), that the
court would reverse its Spaulding holding if the argument were made
in a subsequent case. Unless and until that time, however, the only
remaining content to the exchange-for-value requirement lies in ex-
44. "'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 'it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.'" L. CARROLL, THROUGH
THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE (1896). But cf. State v.
Wiley, 219 Neb. 740, 365 N.W.2d 844 (1985). In Wiley the defendant wrote a check
for $148 more than the sales price of merchandise (sales price was $3,238.65). He
provided a non-existent address for merchandise delivery and took the $148 in
cash. No merchandise was (or, evidently, could have been) delivered. Defendant
pled to a Class III felony bad check (value in excess of $1,000). The court upheld
the conviction both because it was on defendant's plea and because the face value
of the check was more than $1,000 even though the value received was only $148.
45. 211 Neb. 575, 319 N.W.2d 449 (1982).
46. The court decided that an apparent account balance produced through kiting was
value under the Nebraska criminal code definition of value. 1d. at 577-78, 319
N.W.2d at 451. See supra note 39. It found the criminal code language determina-
tive in the face of an argument that value for the bad check offense should be
determined according to the Nebraska Uniform Commercial Code definition.
State v. Spaulding, 211 Neb. 575, 577-78, 319 N.W.2d 449, 451 (1982). See NEB.
U.C.C. § 3-303 (1980).
47. See generally Brief for Appellant, State v. Spaulding, 211 Neb. 575, 319 N.W.2d
449 (1982).
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cluding gifts and a pre-existing debt such as my D's in the hypothetical
above. If "anything of value" includes pre-existing debts and gifts as
well as checks drawn on one bank and deposited in another,48 then
"anything of value" provides no limitation at all and, so unlimited,
does not qualify the "knowledge" requirement in the way the Kock
court said produced specific intent. If anything at all is value in an
exchange for value, then knowledge and specific intent necessarily
must mean the same thing. If the Nebraska Supreme Court is pre-
pared to find that anything at all is value, then it expressly should
reverse its Kock holding and say clearly what now is suggested infer-
entially: that knowledge is a constitutionally sufficient mens rea for a
bad check offense.
To leave anything of the Kock court logic, then, the court must find
my absconding $100,000 bad check passer not covered by the statute.
Its reason, however, would not be the absence of specific intent but
that the $100,000 check passer committed no offense because his con-
duct was not covered by the statute.49
It is clear that the Kock court employed faulty reasoning to find an
intent-to-defraud requirement in, and thereby uphold, the constitu-
tionality of the Nebraska bad check statute. It further is clear that in
Spaulding the court then undermined its own faulty premise by find-
ing that check kiting was an exchange for value. Yet, even taking the
Kock holding with its Spaulding gloss, it nonetheless still appears that
48. I am not suggesting here that it is bad policy to place such transactions outside
the scope of a bad check offense (in fact, I think it is good policy). I merely am
suggesting that the Nebraska Supreme Court should recognize that the Kock
court decision (as well as the statutory language itself) logically compels their
exclusion. For views that these transactions should not be outside the scope of
the offense, see Colin v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 371, 168 S.W.2d 500 (1943) (where
intent to defraud is proved it is constitutional under the imprisonment for debt
clause to prosecute for a pre-existing debt); MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.22 com-
mentary at 117-118 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
Under the Model Penal Code no specific intent to defraud is required. A
stated purpose of the Model Penal Code offense is to assure that a bad check
passer does not go unpunished simply because the benefit derived was not prop-
erty or because the misrepresentation might be considered one of intention to
perform a promise rather than a misrepresentation of existing fact (e.g., the prob-
lem with a post-dated check). Id. at § 206.22 commentary at 117-18 & § 206.2 com-
ment 7. Broadening the concept of property was considered appropriate because
the check passer knows that the check may be renegotiated in exchange for prop-
erty or, in the case of a check drawn on Bank A and deposited in Bank B, the
check passer knows he is acquiring bank credit not due. Id.
49. The problem is not the absence of specific intent to defraud but the absence of a
"thing of value" for the theft. Similarly, if D decides to kill V, picks up a gun,
aims it carefully, shoots six times and punctures the heart six times of what he
believes to be a sleeping V, but V already is dead, D has not committed murder. It
is not murder because D has not committed the requisite act with its requisite
consequence. Surely, however, the specific intent is present.
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at least one section of the present statute is unconstitutional.50 The
statute makes it a Class II misdemeanor to pass a bad check, as did my
$100,000 check passer, with present knowledge of insufficient funds.51
This section does not by its terms require an exchange for value.
Since it is the exchange-for-value statutory language (however little
the court thinks the value must be) that the Kock court said creates
specific intent to defraud, and since specific intent is needed to make
the offense constitutional, this section must fall.52
The only conceivable way to avoid this result, short of reversing
Kock and beginning anew, would be for the court to declare specific
intent a constitutionally necessary element for felonies only, not mis-
demeanors. Without the Kock opinion sitting there this result might
not be all that remarkable. There is, after all, a relationship between
level of mens rea provided as an element of an offense and the poten-
tial punishment upon conviction of that offense.5 3 It nonetheless
would take remarkable legerdemain for the Nebraska Supreme Court
after Kock to achieve that result here.
The Nebraska imprisonment for debt provision prohibits criminal-
izing the non-fraudulent incurring of a debt. The Class II misde-
meanor provision criminalizes the knowing (but not necessarily
fraudulent) incurring of a debt (by passing the bad check). Since a
Class II misdemeanor carries a potential six months behind bars,54 it is
imprisonment for debt under Kock.
B. The Program
Let us now return to the notice describing the Nebraska bad check
statute.55 It warns that with "NO EXCEPTIONS!," "anyone who
writes a bad check" must attend the bad check class, pay a fee and
make restitution, or "be subject to criminal charges."5 6
50. The Kock court expressly reserved judgment on the constitutionality of any as-
pect of the statute other than § 28-611(1). State v. Kock, 207 Neb. 731, 736, 300
N.W.2d 824, 836 (1981).
51. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-611(3) (Supp. 1985).
52. A finding that § 611(3) is unconstitutional would not take with it the entire stat-
ute. Nebraska specifically permits severance where, as here, the unconstitutional
provision may be struck without injury to the chief thrust of the statute and
where, as here, the struck section is not one whose inclusion was essential for
legislative enactment. See, e.g., State v. Sporhase, 213 Neb. 484, 486-87, 329
N.W.2d 855, 856-57 (1983); Linn v. Linn, 205 Neb. 218, 226, 286 N.W.2d 765, 769
(1980).
53. See infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text for further discussion.
54. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-106 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
55. See supra text at note 1 for the full text of the notice.
56. There is no question that the "subject to criminal charges" language is meant to
mean prosecution: "People know that if they don't come to class, they will be
prosecuted . . . ." The Journalist (U. of Neb. School of Journalism), Nov. 28,
1984, at 2, col. 1 (quoting Eric McMasters, Director, Pretrial Diversion).
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We all might agree that it would be a better world if all of us knew
how to manage finances and balance a checkbook. We also might
agree that it would be a better world if all of us exercised care in fi-
nancial transactions. To my knowledge, however, the state's social
welfare power, without more, has never been read so broadly as to
compel adult attendance at classes to study subjects, such as financial
planning and management, that would make this a better world. And
if the social welfare power extends that far, surely statutory authority
is a necessary condition precedent.
The power to compel class attendance, then, derives not from an
amorphous social welfare power vested in the county attorney but
from his power to prosecute crime. Diversion programs 57 such as the
bad check program are derivative of that prosecutorial function. Be-
cause the county attorney may prosecute the bad check offense he can
instead permit an individual the less onerous alternative to prosecu-
tion, attendance at a bad check class.
The only people who may be compelled to attend the bad check
class are those who otherwise could be prosecuted for the bad check
offense. If the bad check by itself justifies a decision to prosecute,
then the bad check by itself justifies compelled class attendance. The
prosecutorial charging function requires, however, both a probable
cause determination that the offense has been committed,58 and a de-
termination that there is some fair chance to prove it beyond a reason-
able doubt. Using the bad check by itself to trigger a decision to
prosecute may not meet a probable cause determination and, in any
case, hardly constitutes a reasoned or even a reasonable exercise of
prosecutorial judgment. 59
What about the actual operation of a bad check program? As indi-
cated earlier, the whole problem may be the wording of the notice, as
the notice may misstate not only the law but the actual consequences
attendant on the writing of a bad check. In that case the program,
57. Diversion programs permit persons who otherwise would be prosecuted to avoid
prosecution by successful program participation. Although diversion differs from
a plea bargain in that there neither is a formal guilty plea nor judicial sanction of
the bargain, diversion programs have been upheld as constitutional so long as
there is sufficient showing that the individual diverted committed the crime.
58. For a fuller discussion of whether there is probable cause to arrest or prosecute,
see infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
59. Contrast with the bad check offense and compelled program participation a good
driving class offered in many jurisdictions to speeders and drunk drivers as an
alternative to prosecution (or, more likely, at least for speeders, as an alternative
to license points accumulation on admission of guilt by payment of the ticket).
Both speeding and D.W.I. offenses normally are strict liability offenses. The
speeding ticket not only constitutes probable cause, it is enough to establish proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, for a drunk driver probable cause exists on
the stop together with officer observation or upon failure to pass a breathalyzer
test.
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notwithstanding the notice publicizing it, still would operate within
legal and constitutional parameters.
A description of Nebraska bad check programs necessarily is re-
stricted to describing the Lancaster County .program since, although
bad check programs are in effect all over the country, to date Lancas-
ter County has the only program actually operating in Nebraska.60 A
close review of the Lancaster County program is useful since it is
likely to be a model for other county programs. What is ill-advised or
illegal about the Lancaster program, if uncorrected, may be imple-
mented in other counties.
In Lancaster County, once a merchant pays his seven dollar fee and
thereby notifies the county attorney, the bad check program mecha-
nism begins. A letter and information sheet are mailed from the
county attorney to the bad check writer.6 1 The letter and information
sheet describe two aspects of the program on which I want to focus.
The first is the program's mandatory and all-inclusive reach. The sec-
ond is the prohibition against restitution without class attendance.
1. Mandatory and All-Inclusive Reach
The county attorney letter describes bad check class attendance
(and payment of thirty-five dollar fee and restitution) as mandatory
prerequisites to avoiding arrest warrant issuance and subsequent crim-
inal prosecution. The letter and information sheet prohibit calls to the
county attorney "about this program," as well as questions or requests
for excuse from attendance to personnel at pretrial diversion (who
handle class registration and administration). The only stated way to
avoid both the class and prosecution is by bank letter admitting the
bad check was due to bank error.
With the exception of bank-confessed bank errors, then, the pro-
gram does what the notice describes. As a consequence, the program
exerts unlawful authority in two ways. Its scope is too broad, at least
to the extent that it includes anyone for whom no probable cause ex-
ists to believe he committed a bad check offense. And it ignores the
prosecutorial investigative and charging function, or at best cedes it to
the reporting merchant.6 2
a. Probable Cause: Is a Bounced Check Enough?
A merchant's report of a bounced check, whether or not that check
60. Telephone interview with Eric McMasters, Director, Lancaster County Pretrial
Diversion (Aug. 7, 1985), recorded in memo from L. Hardy to J.R. Potuto (Aug. 7,
1985) (on file in R. 210 at U. Neb. Law College) [hereinafter cited as Bad Check
Memo No. 3].
61. See Appendix for text of letter and information sheet.
62. For a discussion of merchant as prosecutor, see infra notes 74-79 and accompany-
ing text.
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was passed inadvertently,63 triggers the bad check program mecha-
nism. Once in motion, the check writer cannot (or cannot easily) stop
it because no explanation or defense (other than bank-confessed bank
error) will be heard. The program set-up thus inexorably moves the
inadvertent check passing case along with all the others. For program
purposes it does not matter that the bad check resulted from an arith-
metical error. It does not matter that the bad check resulted from
failure to record (and, thus, reflect in the account balance) an earlier
check. It does not matter that failure to record the earlier check was
not the fault of the writer of the bad check, but, on a joint account, was
due to failure to record by the other person on the account. It does not
matter that the bad check writer had several checking accounts (busi-
ness, personal, joint), and simply wrote the check on the wrong one,
or that the error resulted from a check written on an account whose
fund insufficiency resulted from a bank seven- or even fifteen-day
hold on a check deposited in the account. It does not matter that the
bank itself deducted funds from the account (without notice to the
check passer) to meet a delinquent loan payment due the bank by the
bad check passer.
None of these explanations matters to the triggering of the pro-
gram mechanism because none of these explanations is heard. Since
all these explanations obviously matter for guilt assessment and a de-
cision to prosecute, they also should be considered before a decision is
made to force program participation-or before threatening to arrest
or prosecute.
Passing a bad check in exchange for merchandise unarguably is
one element of the Nebraska bad check offense. But does passing such
a check, without any evidence of intent (or even, possibly, without any
evidence that there was an exchange for value) 64, constitute probable
63. For a description of the automatic nature of the program and county attorney
failure to oversee or control a merchant's discretion to report a bad check, see
infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
64. On a merchant report of a bad check two inquiries, and two inquiries only, are
made with reference to a diversion decision. County physical records are re-
viewed to assure that a person already convicted of a bad check offense is slotted
for prosecution and not diverted to the class. Similarly, county computer records
are reviewed to assure that a person who already has taken the class is not again
diverted. Bad Check Memo No. 1, supra note 1.
It is true that a merchant completes a county attorney questionnaire when
filing his seven dollar fee. (See Appendix C for the full text of the question-
naire). Most of the information sought in the questionnaire is background infor-
mation that would be useful if the case were ultimately prosecuted (e.g., Who
took the check? Can that person identify the check passer? Were there wit-
nesses to the transaction?). Admittedly, some questions (notably questions 12, 13,
14, 17, 18 and 19) could be employed to screen at least some merchant's reports.
The questionnaire answers, while insufficient to assure only probable cause bad
check cases are forwarded to the bad check class, could provide at least a start on
the screening function. For a discussion of the overreach of the program, see
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cause to believe the offense was committed?65 Admittedly, probable
cause is not self-defining; it is founded on "the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable men, not legal
technicians, act."66 Factual and practical considerations here, given
the myriad possibilities of bad check passing without fraudulent intent
or even knowledge, seem to compel a showing of more than just the
bad check itself to constitute probable cause. Although not entirely
clear, the Model Penal Code takes the position that more than the bad
check is required to make a valid arrest.6 7 That "more" could be a
history of bad checks by the check writer or failure to make good on a
check after notice. 68 It doubtless either is constitutionally compelled,
or at least eminently reasonable prosecutorial policy, to require more
than the evidence of one bad check before authorizing an arrest.
b. The Illegal Arrest Threat: In Terrorem and Ultra Vires
Constitutional arrest authority and sound prosecutorial policy cer-
tainly demonstrate the need to revamp the present bad check pro-
gram. There is, in addition, a statutory prohibition not only to arrests
triggered by a bad check alone but also to most arrests, period (and,
therefore, threats of arrest that result in coerced class attendance),
under the bad check statute. 69 Nebraska has an express policy favor-
ing citation in lieu of arrest "to the maximum extent consistent with
the effective enforcement of the law and the protection of the pub-
supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, however, the answers
are not employed to help screen merchant reports.
The questionnaire answers are used for information purposes only. The
merchant answers are not reviewed by an attorney before the "class or arrest"
letter is mailed. Thus, for example, an answer indicating no merchant attempt to
contact the bad check passer does not result in rejection of the merchant's com-
plaint, nor avoid a "class or arrest" letter being sent to the check passer. The
questionnaire answers simply are filed as part of the routine processing of a
merchant report. Bad Check Memo No. 1, supra note 1.
Since the bad check program triggers automatically upon merchant report
with no attorney evaluation, it is possible that even the statutory exchange-for-
value requirement may be overlooked. Certainly the program has no internal
controls designed to avoid this result.
65. The fourth amendment prerequisite for an arrest and prosecution is probable
cause. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
66. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
67. The Model Penal Code seemingly finds probable cause on the basis of the bad
check combined with the failure of the check passer after notice to make good on
the check. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.22 comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 2 1954).
68. In fact, failure to make good after notice is the basis of a presumption in Ne-
braska that the bad check writer acted with knowledge. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
611(5) (Supp. 1985). Whatever the constitutionality of the presumption, see infra
notes 133-150 and accompanying text, such failure, together with the bad check
itself, undoubtedly is sufficient to constitute probable cause.
69. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-422, -425, -427 (1979).
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lic."70 Police officers have citation authority for all misdemeanors; 71
county attorney and magistrate authority extends to felonies.7 2 Cer-
tainly the average bad check passer, without or even with intent, is
unlikely to constitute a public danger. Arrest authority, if it exists at
all, must therefore be found in a need for "effective enforcement of
the law." The term, while vague, does have statutory content. It ap-
pears to authorize arrests when there are "reasonable grounds" to be-
lieve the suspect otherwise will flee the jurisdiction.73 While some
bad check passers (most likely transients) do present this danger, most
bad check passers do not.
c. Merchant as Prosecutor
Since the letter and information sheet issue automatically on a
merchant's report and payment of a seven dollar fee, the merchant
who cares about one bad check sets the whole bad check program in
motion. The program is automatic, with not only no evaluation by the
county attorney as to whether an offense has been committed and may
be proven, but also with no opportunity available to make an evalua-
tion. The result is an abdication of the prosecutorial function,7 4 carry-
ing with it the very real potential of unjustified intrusion by the
criminal process into the lives of the citizens. Since, as described
above, the right legally to force class attendance hinges on the right
legally to prosecute, automatic and mandatory program operation per-
mits illegal use of the prosecutorial power.
Under the bad check program prosecutorial discretion, if exercised
at all, is exercised by the reporting merchants ceded the power to trig-
ger the program mechanism. Such discretion, in practice vested in
merchant, not prosecutor, may be unconstitutional either generally as
70. Id. at § 29-422.
71. Id. Their citation authority also includes infractions and ordinance violations.
72. Id. at § 29-425.
73. Id. at § 29-427. While this section specifically is directed at arresting officers,
there seems no good policy reason why it is not equally applicable to the county
attorney's decision whether to authorize an arrest warrant.
74. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 3 to 3.9 (1980):
(a) . . .a prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or
permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of suf-
ficient admissable evidence to support a conviction.
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the
evidence might support.... Illustrative of the factors which the prose-
cutor may properly consider in exercising his or her discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact
guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(e) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater i
number or degree than can reasonably be supported with evidence at
trial.
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an unconstitutional delegation of power, or on equal protection
grounds related to the specific exercise of the power.
Although no cases were found dealing with merchants as prosecu-
tors under a bad check statute, courts have considered the constitu-
tionality of statutes challenged as ceding banks the prosecutorial
power.75 The argument regarding banks is similar to that regarding
merchants: a bank's policy decision whether to honor a check written
on insufficient funds serves to send forward for prosecution not all bad
check writing depositors, but only those depositors that bank policy
fails to protect by honoring the check. Banks often honor checks on
insufficient funds written by depositors with good credit records at the
bank, or who also have savings accounts, or have a long history of
many transactions with a bank, or who simply happen to know well
the right officers at the bank. Were all these checks to bounce and all
these check writers to go forward to a prosecutor, he well might make
prosecutorial selection decisions different from those made by the
bank. The policy interests, and therefore exercises of discretion, by
prosecutor and bank will not always coincide.
Not surprisingly, courts have both upheld and rejected challenges
that particular bad check statutes unconstitutionally vested
prosecutorial discretion in banks.76 Those courts that upheld the con-
stitutionality of the statutes generally did so by finding that the bank
did not preempt the prosecutor's prosecutorial decision. In the case of
the reporting Nebraska merchant, however, the diversion decision ef-
fectively is made by him. The county attorney presumably evaluates
for prosecution only those cases of bad check passers who refuse the
class. Yet, since the diversion decision itself is a prosecutorial decision,
it is difficult to see how the automatic and mandatory nature of the
program on merchant report can be anything but an unconstitutional
ceding of responsibility.
It may be argued that, whatever the legality, no real harm is done
by permitting a merchant's report to trigger forced class attendance or
threat of arrest and prosecution, since merchants will exercise due
care in screening bad checks and will report only those they consider
to represent flagrant conduct (several bad checks, very large checks,
failure to make good after notice) to the county attorney. As to that,
75. In this Article "bank" is used not in any technical sense, but includes savings and
loan associations and other financial institutions offering checking accounts or
equivalent accounts honoring signed orders for the payment of money. Bank dis-
cretion affecting charging decisions exists in addition to the merchant's discretion
in Nebraska. Some checks on insufficient funds will be honored by Nebraska
banks and thus will avoid a merchant's opportunity to report the check as bad.
76. See, e.g., Tolbert v. State, 294 Ala. 738, 321 So. 2d 227 (1975) (constitutional); Peo-
ple v. Quinn, 190 Colo. 534, 549 P.2d 1332 (1976) (unconstitutional); State v.
Haremza, 213 Kan. 201, 515 P.2d 1217 (1973) (constitutional); Dunaway v. State,
561 P.2d 103 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (constitutional).
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however, it is possible only to guess: an evaluation of the number and
type of reports made and merchant practice before reporting is neces-
sary. In guessing as to merchant conduct it seems at least reasonable
to expect that some merchants might report every bounced check, or
every one passed by a member of a minority group7 7 (if the merchant
knows or can guess minority status), or every one passed by a student
or by someone new to the community. A newspaper report of one per-
son's experience with the bad check program7 8 supports the guess that
even factually innocent and non-flagrant instances of bad check writ-
ing are reported by merchants. This person-a student-passed a nine
dollar insufficient funds check. She was quoted as saying she had no
opportunity to repay the check nor even knew her check had bounced
until the county attorney "class or arrest" letter arrived.79
2. Restitution Prohibition
The county attorney practice revealed in the notice and letter does
more than cede prosecutorial discretion to merchants. It does more
than threaten illegal arrest. It does more than threaten at least some
factually innocent persons with prosecution. At least in one respect it
seems to run counter to provisions in the bad check statute itself.
The bad check statute presumes knowledge by a bad check passer
in any case where, after notice by merchant, bank, or county attorney,
the check passer fails to make good on the check.8 0 The statute also
provides that restitution is a sentence mitigator.8 1 Obviously, then,
the legislature anticipates restitution made by someone who is to be
prosecuted either before or at the time of prosecution. Restitution as a
sentence mitigator must be, in fact, a specific legislative attempt to
encourage restitution.
The county attorney, however, evidently permits restitution (at
least pretrial anyway) to be made only by those who successfully com-
plete the bad check class and, therefore, are not to be prosecuted.8 2
The directive seems contrary to the statute in that it prohibits that
which the statute seems to contemplate if not encourage. Better prac-
77. The fact that county attorney and bank or merchant "prosecution" decisions
might differ makes real the equal protection spectre lurking in the present opera-
tion of the bad check program. A county attorney charged with enforcing the law
is, to put it mildly, unlikely to choose to prosecute only minority group bad check
passers.
78. And numerous anecdotes reported by students.
79. The Journalist (U. of Neb. School of Journalism), Nov. 28, 1984, at 2, col. 5.
80. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-611(5) (Supp. 1985).
81. Id. at § 28-611(7).
82. It theoretically is possible, of course, that those to be prosecuted are screened
beforehand by the county attorney and offered the option to make restitution. In
practice, however, there is no such screening of merchant reports. See Bad Check
Memo No. 1, supra note 1.
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tice probably would be to permit repayment outside the auspices of
the bad check course and to have the county attorney make additional
arrangements to assure class attendance.8 3 At the very least county
attorney practice in refusing restitution avoids any possibility of use of
the statutory knowledge presumption in a bad check prosecution.8 4
Failure to repay after notice hardly could give rise to a presumption of
knowledge when failure to repay is due to county attorney express
directive.
C. County Attorney Responsibilities to Bad Check Statute and Program
A county attorney obviously is charged with upholding the law.
His chief responsibility is the prosecution of criminal cases.8 5 Why,
then, the hands-off approach to passers of bad checks? Why the sum-
mary treatment afforded to a bad check writer reported by a
merchant? Undoubtedly the answer lies in the efficient operation of
the office of county attorney as defined by the law enforcement priori-
ties set by the office.
Investigation and prosecution of crime takes time, money, and
manpower. A bad check written with specific intent to defraud cer-
tainly is a crime. But in terms of general societal needs and
prosecutorial hierarchical interests the bad check offense generally is
and should be low man on the totem pole.8 6 The offense grades far
below murder, rape, child abuse, and other violent crimes, and proba-
bly grades below-or at least not ahead of--drug offenses and trespas-
sory theft offenses. 8 7 A bad check program automatic on merchant
report permits the county attorney to focus on other crimes while also
83. One explanation for present county attorney practice undoubtedly is the fear that
once restitution is made a merchant may lose interest in pursuing a bad check
prosecution. See F. BEUTEL, supra note 2, at 359-60 ("The businessman wants
collection, being interested in prosecution only as a secondary matter .... Once
he gets his money by any process, the businessman usually seems to lose all inter-
est in penalties."). This is just another example, however, of the shaky policy
underpinnings of at least certain aspects of the bad check offense, statute, and
program. For a fuller discussion of policy considerations, see infra text accompa-
nying note 100 & notes 102-19.
84. County attorney practice refusing restitution might prove the old adage that
there is a silver lining in every cloud since the statutory presumption likely is
unconstitutional anyway. For a discussion as to whether the presumption ever
constitutionally may be employed, see infra text accompanying notes 133-50.
85. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-1201(1) (1979). His other major statutory duty is to provide
advice and assistance to the county board and other civil officers. Id. at § 23-1203.
86. A good deal of the time merchants could avoid receiving bad checks simply by
employing tighter check-cashing procedures. For a discussion of merchant prac-
tices as well as policy considerations underlying the bad check offense, see infra
text accompanying notes 102-19.
87. For a brief discussion of theft offenses, see supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
Although my information is personal or anecdotal (or both), theft offenses and
straight possessory drug offenses of most drugs are the bottom rung on the ladder
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keeping merchants happy by having the bad check offense dealt with.
As presently described it is an efficient system. The problem is that
the system also handles bad checks passed without specific intent
(translated as knowledge plus an exchange for value). To a merchant,
the presence or absence of specific intent is irrelevant. His concern is
the bad debt, not the mens rea of the debtor. To the county attorney,
however, mens rea may not be ignored. His concern must be the law-
ful operation of the bad check program, not efficient debt collection.
To accomplish lawful program operation, several changes need to
be made. These changes require greater initial county attorney in-
volvement in the program and probably involve county attorney con-
tinuing time commitment to program administration. Since most
changes require diluting present overreaching program descriptions,
they also may result in diluting program deterrent effect. Decreased
deterrence likely will result in an increased call for bad check prose-
cutions. This, in turn, may increase county attorney time over that
now given to bad check prosecutions. All in all the revamped program
appears inevitably to be less efficient for the county attorney than the
program as presently operating. What remains to be seen is whether a
scaled-down version it is worth keeping at all.
1. County Attorney Letter and Information Sheet
The county attorney letter and information sheet presently de-
scribe a program that is overbroad and needs revamping. As the pro-
gram is revamped so too must be corresponding program descriptions
in the letter and information sheet. For example, since there should
be afforded the opportunity to make restitution without regard to
class registration or successful completion,88 the letter should either
expressly solicit or at worst be silent as to the opportunity to make
restitution. Even more clearly, the letter may not threaten arrest for
failure to register for the class.8 9
Toning down the letter could result in fewer "voluntary" class reg-
istrants. County attorney follow-up time to assure attendance may be
required. Since more no-shows means fewer bad check writers di-
verted, logically more no-shows should mean more bad check writers
being prosecuted.90 This, in turn, obviously means more work for the
of prosecutorial interest. As a consequence, they are the first jury trials en-
trusted to new prosecutors.
88. For a discussion of why restitution should be permitted, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 80-84.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73 for a discussion of why arrests are
illegal.
90. Or at least time taken considering the case and deciding whether to prosecute. In
practice, the no-shows might just be ignored, especially if the no-show is a first-
time bad check writer.
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county attorney.
2. Merchant Notice
The notice displayed by merchants similarly needs revising to state
correct law and describe accurately the revamped bad check program.
The notice, although not directly related to the county attorney's
prosecutorial function, is still the county attorney's responsibility.
The county attorney has a general obligation to see that the laws
are enforced and obeyed in his county. This obligation entails some
responsibility affirmatively to disseminate accurate information about
the criminal justice system and to impede the flow of inaccurate infor-
mation.91 His responsibility obviously is enhanced when, as here, the
false information emanates from his own office. If he need not police
supermarket check-out counters he does need to police the county at-
torney desks from which the notices are distributed.
It may be argued, and perhaps correctly, that removal of the arrest
threat and refinement of the offense definition may make the notice a
less effective deterrent. Even if this is so, the county attorney cannot
fulfill his legal responsibility by permitting misstatements of the law
and its consequences. Deterrence (as with on-time trains in Italy)
surely is a worthwhile goal. Yet it cannot justify anything done in its
name.
3. Making the All-Inclusive Less Inclusive
Perhaps the greatest potential usurper of county attorney time and
manpower relates to the necessity to screen bad check cases reported
to the office. The county attorney must devise a way to assure that the
circumstances of each bad check reported give rise to a probable cause
belief that an offense was committed. Only then may the bad check
writer be diverted to a bad check class. Assuring probable cause that
the bad check offense was committed (and not merely that a bad
check was passed) could be managed in either of two fashions.
First, each case could be individually investigated and assessed and
a decision made whether to pursue it at all and, if so, whether to offer
diversion or to slot for prosecution. Given the number of bad checks
written and, within that, the number for which probable cause for the
offense can be established, this process could eat up county attorney
91. This responsibility is not specifically set forth by statute. In my college political
science class we called these "informal role requirements," no less real than for-
mal requirements. The legislature briefly considered making explicit the county
attorney's obligation to disseminate information about the bad check offense. LB
445, § 3, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (1985). The obligation, however, was in a section au-
thorizing establishment of bad check programs. That section was deleted for rea-
sons having nothing to do with the county attorney's obligation to provide
information. See supra note 5.
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staff and funds. Were I the county attorney faced with individual
screening of each of these cases, my solution would be to go after only
the egregious cases for prosecution and otherwise to dismantle the bad
check program. For me, anything more would be an injudicious and
indefensible use of funds.
The other alternative would have the county attorney promulgate
criteria for merchants to follow in reporting bad checks. 92 The crite-
ria would obviate county attorney need to screen each case since the
criteria, when met in a particular case, would establish probable cause.
For example, the county attorney could require that, before making a
bad check report, a merchant must first make a good faith effort to
obtain repayment. 93 I think it would be eminently good policy, in fact,
to define a good faith effort to include merchant use of a private debt
collection service in attempting to obtain payment on the check.94
Combined with a requirement of merchant certification of what value
was obtained in exchange for the bad check, good faith (but unsuccess-
ful) collection effort by a merchant reporting a bad check passer
would assure that a filed merchant report represents a probable cause
bad check case. 95
Another example of useful law enforcement criteria might be to
permit a merchant to report a repeat bad check passer without first
resorting to private debt collection efforts. Indeed, it might be that
the county attorney would solicit, or at least permit, merchant reports
of a repeat bad check passer even if he makes good on each bad check
passed. Such a bad check passer might well be violating the statute in
the hope that only some merchants will force him to pay up. He is
someone who could be prosecuted and should (and could) be required
to take the bad check class.
An automatic program triggered upon a probable cause bad check
92. In a way he already does this, on a limited basis, through use of a questionnaire.
At present, however, merchant answers are used for informational purposes only
and do not influence the diversion decision. See supra note 64 for a fuller
discussion.
93. And make some showing, perhaps by return receipt on a registered letter, of hav-
ing made the effort.
94. Probable cause would exist even if the merchant was unable to locate the bad
check passer since this would at least demonstrate bad address information on
the check, and bad address information in turn gives rise to an inference that the
check passer intended to defraud.
95. Even here it might not be possible to convict. My TV purchaser, for example,
would be a check passer who did not make good on the check. And clearly an
indigent or a bankrupt might not make good on a check without having a specific
intent to defraud. (In the case of the bankrupt he might be under court order not
to make good. See infra note 99.) In these cases, however, there nonetheless
would be probable cause. For each of these merchant-reported cases, then, the
county attorney lawfully could send a class or prosecution (but not a class or
arrest) letter.
[Vol. 65:242
NEBRASKA BAD CHECK OFFENSE
offense report would no longer raise the policy overreach and consti-
tutional questions attendant on the present program. But this ap-
proach to enforced program participation is more time-consuming and
costly, and hence less attractive to a merchant who currently need
make no recoupment effort before reporting his bad check. As be-
tween merchant and county attorney interests and expenses, however,
I believe this approach puts the onus where it properly belongs-on
the merchant.9 6
If the county attorney establishes procedures assuring that only
probable cause offenses are reported, he probably can continue to re-
quire class attendance while refusing to entertain explanations or de-
fenses. Refusal to listen coupled with merchant-screened cases would
optimize county attorney time focused elsewhere. As a prosecutorial
policy choice, however, I believe bad check writers should have at
least some opportunity to explain.
The bad check writer whose name was reported by a merchant af-
ter a failed merchant attempt to get repayment might still be factually
innocent or not be provably guilty of the offense, or be like, for exam-
ple, my TV customer described above,97 someone the county attorney
might elect not to prosecute even though provably guilty. The bad
check passer, even after merchant effort, still might not know about
the bounced check until the county attorney letter arrives. He might
have changed addresses. Or someone else in the household might
either have taken the merchant's phone call and failed to relay the
message, or have signed for the merchant's registered letter and then
neglected to give it to the bad check passer. Failure to repay also
might derive from genuine impoverishment 9s or bankruptcy.99 Espe-
cially where there is no history of bad check writing the check passer's
explanation, if believed, might lead a prosecutor to waive compelled
96. For a discussion of the reasons why, see infra text accompanying notes 102-11 &
118-19.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
98. The problem of the indigent raises additional questions about the constitutional-
ity of the present bad check program. Successful program completion requires
payment of restitution and the $35 class charge. Suppose, however, the bad check
passer is indigent. Is program certification withheld? According to the director
of pretrial diversion, this problem has never arisen. See Bad Check Memo No. 2,
supra note 5. To withhold certification on nonpayment by an indigent (and
thereby trigger criminal prosecution) raises serious constitutional problems. See,
e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). Concern with program treatment of
indigents was, in fact, one reason why the Nebraska Unicameral declined specifi-
cally to authorize these programs. See supra note 5.
99. The problem of the bankrupt raises even more questions than that of the indi-
gent. As a private debt collection mechanism payment of restitution upon
merchant letter is foreclosed by an automatic stay from the bankruptcy court
effective upon filing of bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982). If the restitution or-
der arises out of the bad check program the question is whether it is a criminal
prosecution exempt from the otherwise mandatory stay on bankrupt payments.
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class attendance (or decide there is no power to compel). Since opera-
tion of a bad check program on probable cause prefers one citizen
class-creditors (merchants)-over another-debtors (consumers)-
hearing out explanations is one step toward redressing the balance.
IV. PUBLIC COLLECTION OF PRIVATE DEBTS
Suppose the Nebraska Constitution is amended tomorrow or the
Nebraska Supreme Court, on reconsideration, decides that a bad check
offense does not require a specific intent to defraud (translated as
knowledge plus an exchange for value). Suppose, further, that the
legislature considered eliminating even a knowledge requirement for
commission of the offense. Would an offense so defined be wise policy,
reflecting "'the good sense of mankind?' "100 And, whether or not
wise policy, would it violate federal and state due process constitu-
tional protections?01 In other words, should we? And could we?
A. Should We?
To decide whether societal interests require a more intrusive bad
check policy than even the one presently operating, we need to know
just what are the parameters of this problem facing merchants? How
many checks bounce? How many are never repaid or are repaid only
after private agency debt collection? How much money actually is lost
and not discounted through business bad debt loss reporting on a tax
return, 02 or translated into higher prices for goods to compensate for
the bad checks? Are we talking about a great deal of money lost to
individual merchants or significantly higher costs passed on to each
consumer?
In 1957 a bad check study was conducted in Nebraska to determine
"[w]hat are the real facts?" 103 While it is clear that merchants con-
Id. at § 362 (b)(1). See generally Lewis & Jennings, Bad Checks and Bankruptcy,
57 FLA. B.J. 531 (1983).
The question of whether it is a criminal prosecution or merely a proprietary
function of the office turns, in part, on whether the county attorney exercises
prosecutorial discretion and control. See infra note 113 for a discussion of
whether the program, as presently operated, is so far outside the routine scope of
his office that it subjects the county attorney to civil liability. To the extent the
prosecutor acts as civil debt collector and not law enforcement officer to "[ex-
tract] a preference not accorded other creditors ..... " the bankruptcy action
stays his hand. In re Caldwell, 5 Bankr. 740, 742 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980). See also
In re Reid, 9 Bankr. 830, 831 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981) (court stay of proceedings as
long as debtor "complies with his plan"). But see Barnette v. Evans, 673 F.2d
1250, 1251 (11th Cir. 1982) (allowing state criminal prosecution to proceed).
100. State ex rel Norton v. Janing, 182 Neb. 539, 544, 156 N.W.2d 9, 12 (1968) (quoting
People v. Holder, 53 Cal. App. 45, 53, 199 P. 832, 836 (1921)).
101. U.S. CONsT. amend. V & XIV; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
102. See 26 U.S.C. § 166(a) (1982).
103. F. BEUTEL, supra note 2, at 257.
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sider the problem as very serious, the study results showed that "both
individually and collectively bad check losses to business are of no
commercial consequence. In fact, they are probably the smallest ex-
pense the business suffers, so small that not a single business inter-
viewed outside of banks was found to insure itself against such
losses."104 The 1957 data indicated that 40 percent of businesses ex-
perienced no bad check losses and the yearly average for the rest was
one bad check.105
The study, of course, is more than twenty-five years old; the use of
personal checks no doubt has increased substantially since 1957. Yet I
know of no more recent empirical study governing the use and effects
of bad checks, and I am inclined to believe, particularly with the ex-
plosion in use of credit cards, that its findings by and large continue to
reflect the true parameters of the bad check problem as it relates to
local merchants.
One aspect of the bad check problem certainly continues true to-
day. A good deal of the time merchants could avoid receiving bad
checks simply by employing tighter check cashing procedures.106 I, as
much as anyone, enjoy the convenience of paying a bill by check at a
supermarket or drug store.107 I would hate always having to pay cash
or to endure long waits at checkout lines while customer credit is in-
vestigated thoroughly. Merchants certainly realize that mine is a com-
104. Id. at 269. Banks today routinely impose service charges on insufficient funds
checks. For a discussion of the reasonableness and legality of these charges, see
Comment, Insufficient Fund Check Charges: The Need for Legislative Action, 45
OHIO ST. L.J. 1003 (1984).
105. F. BEUTEL, supra note 2, at 405. Recently, California grocers claimed they lose
$100 million yearly. Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1985, at 19, col. 3. But no breakdown was
provided as to average merchant loss. For Nebraska merchants the average 1957
loss on one check was $10. F. BEUTEL, supra note 2, at 405. The Beutel study also
found that certain businesses are much more likely than others to experience bad
check losses. Six business categories-gas stations, bars and liquor stores, restau-
rants, clothing stores, jewelry stores, and department stores-experienced more
than 75 percent of all business bad check losses. Id. at 269, 272.
106. See id. at 275-78 for a description of merchant check-cashing precautionary proce-
dures, or, more accurately, the complete lack thereof, in 1957.
There surely are many ways a merchant could protect himself from receiving
bad checks. He could refuse to accept all personal checks (most banks, for exam-
ple, refuse to cash personal checks unless the check casher has an account with
them) or out-of-state or out-of-county personal checks. He could phone in a
credit check before cashing the check. He could cash checks only for those he
knows personally or who do frequent business in the store. He could charge a
check-cashing fee (and thus accumulate a fund to cover any unpaid bounced
checks). He could adopt a practice common in large cities and issue a store identi-
fication card (after credit check) whose presentation is necessary for cashing
checks.
107. This is a convenience notable by its absence in more densely populated areas of
the country.
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mon customer reaction.10 8 They therefore are reluctant to institute
tighter check-cashing policy for fear that customer inconvenience and
annoyance might put their stores at competitive disadvantage: cus-
tomers, after all, might be prompted to take their business to a more
accommodating check-cashing merchant.109
If, to stay competitive, a merchant chooses knowingly to continue a
check-cashing policy that runs him some risk, he is not an unsuspect-
ing victim. He has made a business judgment to foster optimum cus-
tomer satisfaction at the risk of an occasional bounced check that is
not made good. At worst, that unpaid bad check is to him simply a
cost of doing business. And if that cost is too high, the merchant can
continue to please his customers simply by engaging a private debt
collection service to go after these bad debts. Any cost to him not
recouped by bad check passer payment (either because bad check col-
lection costs are assessed against the merchant and not the bad check
passer, or because a particular bad check goes unpaid) is still simply a
business bad debt loss that he may claim on his tax return or recover
in court as any other civil debt.11o A merchant, moreover, has an ad-
vantage over other civil creditors since he can and presumably does
pass on his bad check costs to consumers.
Except for the bad check passer who is a true social menace-the
forger, the repeated check passer-the criminal justice system should
leave the merchant to the reality of his business risk knowingly un-
dertaken. It is and should be no business of the system to intercede-
or even try to-in private, commercial, contractual relations between
citizens.
When it does intercede, the state ends up in the unseemly position
of acting as a debt collection agency with the taxpayer footing what
otherwise would be the merchant's costs for collecting the debt. Yes,
the merchant pays a seven dollar fee to trigger county attorney in-
volvement.11 But the fee surely does not cover county attorney inves-
tigative and prosecutorial costs.1 1 2 Charging the fee, moreover, only
108. Liberal check-cashing policy is seen as a good will gesture. I& at 275.
109. Finding a more accommodating check casher would be possible only if other
merchants continued to be willing to take more risks concerning bad checks.
Less liberal law enforcement cooperation might spur all merchants to reject
these risks.
110. Of course, a civil suit may prove of little practical help to a merchant since he
either may decide the check amount is too small to warrant suit or in any event
find himself faced with a judgment-proof debtor. Id. at 359. These are problems
faced by many judgment creditors, however. In addition, many states now permit
merchants to sue for the amount of the bad check plus triple damages. Wall St.
J., Dec. 2, 1985, at 19, col. 3. These statutes provide a benefit to a merchant with-
out removing from him his obligation to redress personally his civil grievance.
111. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-611(5) (Supp. 1985).
112. Not to mention prison costs. See F. BEUTEL, supra note 2, at 345-49. What the
merchant gets in return, moreover, is a free service which often saves on this
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makes clearer the debt collecting function being assumed by the
county attorney.113 The fee seems inoffensive in bad check reporting
precisely because it is yet another instance, not of treating bad checks
as crimes, but of criminal treatment of bad check writers primarily to
assist private debt collection. In this sense only does the merchant
sharing a part of the costs seem inoffensive. In other contexts we
would be horrified at the notion that a fee must be paid before a crime
is investigated or prosecuted.
Imagine a rape victim having to pay the county attorney seven dol-
lars before a rape workup is ordered at the hospital. Imagine the vic-
tim of a purse snatching having to pay seven dollars before the
policeman takes off after the fleeing suspect (or radios a description).
Imagine a department store having to pay seven dollars before the
county attorney processes a shoplifting charge. An argument that the
county treasury"14 would be in better shape if a seven dollar fee ac-
companied the report of all crimes would not encourage us to institute
such a system. Indeed, if the state of the county treasury controls, we
would be in better shape if we required a $700 fee. If collection of the
fee is to assure merchant bona fide interest or to deter his reports,
seven dollars certainly is not enough. The fee might as well reflect,
not just seven dollars, but the merchant's proportionate share of the
item alone much more than the entire salary which the officials receive from the
state or county. Many county attorneys and sheriffs would earn much more than
their salaries, if paid at commercial collection agency rates on checks; and
throughout the state, this item, as these offices now operate, would probably
equal or exceed the cost of maintaining the offices. It is small wonder, therefore,
that the pressure on officials to collect is intense, that those who yield to it are
popular and that those who do not, find re-election difficult and sometimes
impossible.
Id. at 293.
113. There also is a question here, beyond the scope of this Article, of the civil liability
of a county attorney engaged in civil debt collection who errs by threatening
arrest of or forcing class participation on a person who through inadvertence
passes a bad check. The county attorney enjoys immunity for all functions relat-
ing to the conduct of his office. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
Since, however, with county attorney official sanction the bad check program in-
cludes those who committed no offense and legally may not be prosecuted (those,
in other words, over whom his office has no jurisdiction), the program as to these
individuals may be outside the scope of the prosecutorial function and make the
county attorney subject to a suit for damages. If he operates as a private debt
collector he may find himself in law treated as one. See supra note 99. If his
actions are ultra vires he may find himself without insurance protection. A factor
that enhances the possibility of prosecutorial civil liability is that, by virtue of the
questionnaire answers (see supra note 64 for a description of the questionnaire
provided merchants), the county attorney may have information in his own files
demonstrating that no bad check offense was committed (even though a bad
check may have been passed). For example, the merchant might have answered
clearly that no value was received in exchange for the check.
114. The check notice fee paid under the bad check statute is credited to the county
general fund. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-611(5) (Supp. 1985).
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county attorney's running of the debt collection service. And if those
are to be the merchant's costs then, of course, why not leave him to his
private debt collection?
The private debt collecting function, especially as we are postulat-
ing here, with no fraudulent intent required, places the state in the
position of preferring one class of citizens, its creditors or merchants,
against another class of citizens, its debtors or customers. And the
state would take sides, remember, with no culpable mens rea required
of the debtor. Such a policy choice is abhorrent. It not only involves
the criminal justice system where it does not belong, it does so without
any assessment of even comparative moral or ethical culpability. It is
bad enough that under the present Nebraska statute my TV customer
may be found to have committed the bad check offense even though
many of us would find right and justice, as it were, to be on his side.115
With no mens rea requirement, or merely negligence or even knowl-
edge, the incidence will increase of those who are criminally but not
morally or ethically culpable.
Not only does elimination or lessening of mens rea potentially
place law enforcement on the "wrong" side of a contract claim, in-
volvement of law enforcement in a civil claim, no matter what side,
markedly is inappropriate. Passing a bad check, believing it to be good
or without knowing or finding out, is careless conduct. Passing a bad
check knowing it is bad (but intending to deposit funds to cover it) also
may be careless or at least ill-advised conduct. Not being able to cover
a debt carelessly undertaken may not be nice. Even in these situa-
tions, however, the criminal justice system and citizen tax dollars are
designed for better use than civil debt collecting.
One inhibitor to criminalizing all bad check writing regardless of
mens rea is that we would be criminalizing conduct potentially en-
gaged in by all of us. Philosophers may argue that conduct may be
treated as criminal even though we expect that conduct might be en-
gaged in by many, or even most, of us. 116 More normally, however,
the definition of crime encompasses only the unusual occurrence or
morally repugnant situation. If we recognize that we all might do it
we hardly are likely to describe it as criminal. And when we do call it
a crime, we run the risk of fostering disrespect for the law if many or
115. Whether in the television case there are dependent or independent promises, and
whether, due to arcane distinctions, an action on the check may be successful
even when there is a defense on the underlying contract claim, are questions
outside the scope of this Article. Nor, for that matter, will I consider the
merchant's authority, if any, to charge a bad check passer debt collection costs in
addition to obtaining payment of the bad check. I leave these and related ques-
tions to a commercial law expert. I undertook what was to be a simple little
project, not a life's work.
116. See Junker, Criminalization and Criminogenesis, 19 UCLA L. REV. 697 (1972).
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most will continue to engage in the conduct.117
The criminal law supplements rather than replaces civil remedies.
Its basic tenet is that it operates in as narrow an area and as limited a
fashion as the dictates of compelling public policy will allow. A crimi-
nal prosecution, after all, does more than simply make easier and
more likely the creditor's debt collection. It carries with it severe
state-caused inconvenience and anxiety. Conviction brings social
stigma and possible economic and political consequences. 118 In view of
the narrow focus of the criminal law, torts become crimes as negligent
conduct moves towards reckless or intentional conduct.1' 9 For bad
checks that line should be crossed only where intent to defraud is
shown.
B. Could We?
Even if Nebraska were to undertake to revamp its entire policy
rationale underlying the bad check offense, the Constitution of the
United States might nonetheless stand to bar the undertaking. The
Supreme Court held in In re Winship that due process requires a state
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact essential to constitute
the elements of the offense charged.120 While it is clear that a state
legislature has enormous latitude in defining the elements that com-
prise a particular crime, 121 it also is clear that a legislature can go too
far in defining out elements of a crime.122 Although it is not at all
clear how far is too far, presumably, and I would think, unarguably, a
culpable mens rea is and must be a core constitutional element of a
117. See, e.g., Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157 (1967).
Criminalizing marijuana use might be an example of a crime so widely ignored
that it fosters disrespect for the law. Prior to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
abortions might have served as another example. The continued controversy to
decriminalize certain crimes-successful regarding abortions-describes another
consequence of an overbroad reach of the criminal laws: public pressure to
amend the laws.
118. See supra note 9.
119. For example, not every battery, although a tort, is a crime. See, e.g., NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-310 (1979). Even a third-degree assault requires at least a reckless
mens rea as well as bodily injury. Id.
120. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
121. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (striking on due process
grounds Maine requirement that defendant prove heat of passion or sudden prov-
ocation to reduce homicide to manslaughter), with Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977) (sustaining New York requirement that murder suspect prove af-
firmative defense of emotional disturbance to reduce homicide to manslaughter).
See generally Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof
in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979).
122. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977). The examples given by the
Court are that (1) a legislature may not declare guilt or presumptive guilt, and (2)
it may not declare presumptive guilt based on indictment or defendant identity.
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malum in se offense. 123 A culpable mens rea also should be a core
constitutional element of any offense carrying any, or at least more
than minimal, prison exposure.124
Strict liability offenses, while unfortunately no longer unheard of
in the criminal law, 125 remain relatively rare. They still apply almost
exclusively to regulatory offenses and not to offenses malum in se.
Conviction of a malum in se offense stigmatizes the defendant because
the crime itself is seen as a moral wrong that announces its criminality
to the world.126 Theft is certainly a common law crime that carries
social stigma.127 And certainly fraud suggests moral wrong. A bad
check statute such as Nebraska's reflects both.
A prison term of any kind also stigmatizes the convicted person
since supposedly the fact and duration of potential punishment is soci-
ety's declaration of how bad it considers the crime. 128 A prison term
and/or a felony conviction also hand the convicted person collateral
consequences and statutory, civil, and informal disablements.129
As a result, legislatures rarely if ever expressly describe a malum
in se offense as one involving strict liability. Again as a result, a court
will read a statute silent as to mens rea to include a mens rea require-
ment on the assumption that that must have been the legislative in-
123. A malum in se offense is a common law offense whose nature signals its wrong-
fulness. At common law malum in se offenses were felonies punishable by total
forfeiture of lands or goods and frequently by death. United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 439 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a clear articulation of the con-
cept that crime equals injury caused plus intent, see Morrissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 250-54 (1952).
124. The point at which minimal exposure time becomes more than minimal relates to
the purpose for which the prison time is considered. For purposes of the sixth
amendment right to counsel the Supreme Court drew the line at any prison time.
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
For purposes of the sixth amendment right to jury trial the line was drawn at
more than six months. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). Where some
mens rea element is retained, minimum prison time may be said roughly to corre-
spond to a misdemeanor (as contrasted with felony) classification in most crimi-
nal codes. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-106 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (Class I
misdemeanor maximum penalty is one year imprisonment or $1,000 fine or both).
No conceivable argument could be made in favor of a sentence on conviction of
longer than one year for an offense carrying no culpable mens rea requirement.
Offenses classified as misdemeanors still normally require at least a negligent if
not a reckless mens rea.
125. E.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (awareness of wrong-
doing not a necessary element to uphold constitutionality).
126. E.g., Sweet v. Parsley, 1970 A.C. 132, 149-50 (1968).
127. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 382-83 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. I use "supposedly" here because we all know that statutory classifications of of-
fenses and gradation of punishments do not always represent internally consis-
tent categories.
129. See supra note 9.
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tent.130 Thus the question whether and what level mens rea
requirement constitutionally is necessary in large part remains unan-
swered in the case law. The dearth of case law demonstrates not that
a strict liability malum in se offense constitutionally is permissible but
that neither courts nor legislatures ever even consider that it might
be.
Nebraska's bad check offense includes prison exposure of up to
twenty years (with a mandatory one-year minimum).131 The least se-
rious bad check offense (for a first offense when the amount of the
check is less than seventy-five dollars) still carries six months expo-
sure.132 Both because it is a malum in se offense and also because it
entails such a high level of prison exposure, under Nebraska as well as
federal constitutional principles surely the bad check offense must
have a mens rea requirement. I would argue, moreover, that the mens
rea requirement (even apart from the Nebraska imprisonment for
debt provision) must be at least knowledge.
V. PRESUMPTIONS AND REIMBURSEMENTS: TWO
ADDITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
A. Presumption of Knowledge (or Intent to Defraud)
Under present Nebraska law the knowledge element (translated as
intent to defraud by the Nebraska Supreme Court's gloss) of the bad
check statute is essential to the constitutionality of the statute.133
Thus, even if Winship134 and its progeny permit legislative elimina-
tion or lessening of the mens rea requirement in a bad check offense
as a matter of federal law,135 as things stand the Nebraska Unicameral
still may not do so. Unicameral hands would be tied not by the due
130. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 2084, 2089 (1985) (Court recognizes
"time-honored interpretive guideline where congressional purpose is unclear");
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (mere omission of intent lan-
guage in embezzlement statute does not eliminate element of crime).
131. These are the maximum potential penalties for a Class III felony. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-105 (1979). A bad check offense is a Class III felony when the face
value of the check is $1,000 or more. Id. at § 28-611(1)(a).
132. This is the maximum potential penalty for a Class II misdemeanor. Id. at § 28-106
(Cum. Supp. 1984). The bad check offense is at least a Class II misdemeanor. Id.
at § 28-611(1).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17 & 23-26. It may be that without the
element of at least knowledge the statute also would be unconstitutional as a
matter of federal law.
134. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 122-32. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975) (striking on due process grounds Maine requirement that defendant
prove heat of passion or sudden provocation to reduce homicide to manslaughter),
with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (sustaining New York require-
ment that murder suspect prove affirmative defense of emotional disturbance to
reduce homicide to manslaughter). See generally Jeffries & Stephan, supra note
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process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, but by the imprisonment for debt clause of the Nebraska
Constitution.
The unavoidable nature of the knowledge (intent to defraud) re-
quirement in the Nebraska bad check statute raises yet another ques-
tion about the Nebraska statute. It is clear that a state may not
statutorily set forth the elements of a particular crime (such as the
knowledge-intent-to-defraud element here) and then simply shift the
burden of proof to the defendant to negative the existence of the
element.s6
In Nebraska, knowledge of check insufficiency is presumed if the
defendant is notified by the merchant or drawee or the county attor-
ney1 37 that a check has bounced and then fails to make good on the
check within ten days.138 Since without question the state must prove
knowledge (intent to defraud) beyond a reasonable doubt, the consti-
tutionality of the statutory presumption of knowledge (intent to de-
fraud) predicated on failure to make good after notice must be tested.
The statutory presumption obviously was a legislative attempt to
ease the state's burden of proof of an element of the offense where
difficulties of proof may be anticipated.13 9 To paraphrase Oscar Wilde,
121, at 1347; Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of
Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1187 (1979).
136. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701 (1975).
137. The defendant must be notified within 30 days of the check's return unpaid. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-611(5) (Supp. 1985).
138. As described supra at text accompanying notes 60-63, the county attorney be-
comes involved when the merchant pays seven dollars and requests county attor-
ney follow-up. Id.
139. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.22 commentary at 118 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). Like
the Nebraska statute, the Model Penal Code presumes knowledge from failure to
make good after notice. Id. at § 224.5(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Unlike
Nebraska, the Model Penal Code also presumes knowledge from the fact that the
issuer had no account with the drawee. Id. at § 224.5(1). Given the Model Penal
Code's pedigree, its record of adoption by the states, and its almost universal use
as a model by commentators and courts, the similarity of the Model Penal Code
presumption to Nebraska's normally would be very persuasive evidence of the
constitutionality of the Nebraska bad check presumption. For a variety of rea-
sons the Model Penal Code offers no such support.
First, the comparative dates of Model Penal Code drafts and the current run
of Supreme Court cases dealing with the constitutionality of presumptions
demonstrate that the Model Penal Code treatment of presumptions never was
evaluated by the drafters in terms of current constitutional law. The Model Pe-
nal Code was adopted in 1962; the final version of its bad check provision was
reviewed in 1954. Id. at § 224.5 note on status of section. The Model Penal Code
position regarding presumptions apparently became final in 1955. Id. at § 1.13
note on status of section. The current run of Supreme Court cases preoccupied
with the constitutionality of presumptions and inferences in criminal cases began
in 1970 with In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt burden is an aspect of due process of law), and did not really
take any form before Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1978). At worst the
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"though most men write a check or two for most there is no crime.14o
The crime comes with the guilty mens rea. Picking out the criminal
act from all acts of bounced checks frequently will not be easy. Hence,
Model Penal Code drafters may be faulted as bad predictors, but they can hardly
be said to have passed on the constitutionality of the bad check knowledge pre-
sumption under cases not be to decided for more than 10, 20, and even 30 years.
In any case, the Model Penal Code approach to presumptions (MPC sections
for which there is no equivalent in the Nebraska Criminal Code) may preserve
the constitutionality of the Model Penal Code bad check presumption. The
Model Penal Code treats affirmative defenses specifically and expressly; it does
not use presumptions to shift either the burden of producing evidence or of per-
suasion on an element. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
& id. at § 1.13 commentary at 110-12 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Under a Model
Penal Code presumption the jury is charged that the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of the presumed fact but that the jury may find,
should it so choose, that the facts giving rise to the presumption are sufficient to
establish the existence of the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The bur-
den of proof on the element remains on the state; finding the presumed fact once
the underlying facts are established is not mandatory. The structure of this jury
charge may be enough to withstand constitutional challenge. See, e.g., Francis v.
Franklin, 105 S. Ct. 1965 (1985); County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S.
140 (1979); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). A stronger evidentiary use of
the presumption (requiring that the jury be told that the underlying facts consti-
tute strong evidence of the presumed fact and that the presumption is established
as a matter of law when no evidence is adduced to negate it) was rejected by the
A.L.I. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 commentary at 116-18 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955).
The grading of the bad check offense as a misdemeanor under the Model Pe-
nal Code, id. at § 224.5 note on status of section (Proposed Official Draft 1962),
may also assist in upholding the constitutionality of the statute. Cf. id. at § 206.22
commentary at 117-18 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954) ("Considering the minor penalties
here contemplated, this behavior may properly be punished"). The Model Penal
Code maximum potential penalty for a misdemeanor is one year. Id. at § 6.08
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). Under the Model Penal Code a prosecution for
felony theft by deception is available for passers of checks over $500. Id. at § 224.5
note on status of section & §§ 223.1 & 223.3. As discussed, supra at text accompa-
nying notes 124-32, the greater the potential punishment the less likely the con-
stitutionality of an elimination of a mens rea requirement. Conversely, the lower
the potential penalty the less culpable the mens rea needed. If, then, a lesser
mens rea requirement would suffice (because of the lesser potential penalty) a
persuasive argument may be made that a presumption similarly should pass mus-
ter for the crime carrying the lower penalty. Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 121,
at 1373-74. So far, however, this is not the approach taken by the Court. See id. at
1397. Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring proof "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" rather than statutory "preponderance of evidence in N.Y. juvenile
proceeding"), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (striking on due pro-
cess grounds Maine requirement that defendant prove heat of passion or sudden
provocation to reduce homicide to manslaughter), with Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197 (1977) (sustaining New York requirement that murder suspect prove
affirmative defense of emotional disturbance to reduce homicide to
manslaughter).
140. 0. WILDE, THE BALLAD OF READING GAOL (1896).
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the presumption is born. Its constitutionality, however, does not fol-
low quite so easily.
The statutory language reads not just as a mandatory141 but as a
conclusive presumption since its terms admit of no possibility of rebut-
tal. As a conclusive presumption it eliminates the state's obligation to
prove knowledge (intent to defraud) and substitutes instead a require-
ment that the state prove notice to the defendant of the bad check4 2
and failure to repay within a specified time. The knowledge (specific
intent) element is irrelevant under the presumption because it
mandatorily and conclusively always will be found present once notice
and failure to repay are proved.
The presumption, as conclusive, is unconstitutional. Notice and
failure to make good certainly do not always prove knowledge of ac-
count insufficiency (much less specific intent to defraud) at the time
the check was passed. A defendant inadvertently might have passed a
bad check and, after notice, failed to repay because now indigent or in
bankruptcy or because, although he thought the account had sufficient
funds when he wrote the check, he believes his error to be his good
fortune since, like my television customer described above,143 he be-
lieves he has a defense to payment.
Suppose the Nebraska Supreme Court, once again endeavoring to
save the statute, were to find in it an opportunity for the defendant to
rebut the presumption.14 4 The question then becomes the constitu-
tionality of a mandatory, but rebuttable, presumption. After years of
shuffling and less than clear articulation, the United States Supreme
Court seems finally to have framed a test for assessing the constitu-
tionality of a mandatory presumption that substitutes for direct proof
of an element of a state's case. 145
The Court has concluded that such a presumption must be evalu-
141. As used here a presumption is an inference of fact drawn from another fact in
evidence. If the presumed fact may be found upon proof of the basic fact, the
presumption is permissive. If the presumed fact must be found upon proof of the
basic fact (unless answered or explained) the presumption is mandatory. A con-
clusive presumption is irrebutable.
142. By the merchant or county attorney. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-611(5) (Supp. 1985).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
144. There is no Nebraska pattern jury instruction regarding the presumption in the
bad check statute. I attempted without success to discover if ever, how often, and
how the presumption is employed.
145. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). Mandatory pre-
sumptions also have been challenged as unconstitutional infringements on a de-
fendant's fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself. The fifth
amendment permits a defendant in a criminal case to remain silent; the
mandatory presumption, however, stands proved if not rebutted. See Nesson,
supra note 135, at 1208-15. Prior to Allen, Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6
(1969), was probably the fullest recent articulation of the Court's position on
presumptions.
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ated on its face without regard to the particular facts of a case.1 46 The
presumption is tested against the world of likely cases and, to be con-
stitutional, the presumption in that world must follow beyond a rea-
sonable doubt from proof of the basic fact.14 7 Thus, the Nebraska
mandatory presumption must fall unless knowledge at the time of
check passing of account insufficiency (specific intent to defraud) fol-
lows beyond a reasonable doubt from notice and a failure to make
good.
Although without question the mandatory presumption is on more
solid constitutional ground than a conclusive one, I nonetheless am
uncomfortable with it. I just do not believe that, over the run of possi-
ble cases, notice and failure to make good demonstrate beyond a rea-
sonable doubt a criminal mens rea at the time the check was passed.
Of course a presumption need not be "accurate in every imaginable
case."148 Yet there are so many opportunities for error in check writ-
ing, combined with reasons for failure after notice later to make good,
that I do not believe the presumption, as mandatory, passes muster. 49
I can think of examples in the run of cases in which specific intent
to defraud is missing. How about a defendant who wrote a check ex-
pecting to be able to deposit funds to cover it and then later has unex-
pected financial reverses? Or suppose the defendant thought he had
funds to cover the check? His error was one of simple addition or it
might have been caused by a check to him that bounces. Again, at the
time of notice and payment demand he may have no funds to cover the
check.150 I could go on. The point here is that subsequent failure to
make good on the check does not prove to me, beyond a reasonable
doubt in the full run of possible cases, intent to defraud when the
check was passed. I think the statute needs revising either to delete
the presumption or to make it no more than a permissive one. As the
146. Because if not rebutted it is sufficient to convict.
147. By contrast, the constitutionality of a permissive presumption is evaluated on the
facts of the particular case; the presumption must follow more likely than not
from the basic fact proved. Compare County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442
U.S. 140, 167 (1979) (as long as presumed fact not "sole and sufficient basis for a
finding of guilt" it satisfies Leary test), with Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36
(1969) (criminal statutory presumption fails as "irrational" unless "substantial as-
surance" that presumed fact is "more likely than not to flow from the proved
fact").
148. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 155 n.14 (1979).
149. Just this past term the United States Supreme Court knocked down what it char-
acterized as a mandatory rebuttable presumption. Francis v. Franklin, 105 S. Ct.
1965 (1985). Franklin was a murder prosecution. The defendant's defense was
that his firing of the gun was accidental, not intentional. The presumption in
Franklin required the jury to find intent as a natural and probable consequence
of firing the gun. The Court found the conviction constitutionally suspect be-
cause the jury might have thought that, with the presumption, it was up to the
defendant to prove that the shooting was an accident.
150. Indeed, his lack of funds may be due to the check that bounced on him.
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statute now stands a trial judge should exercise caution in what and
when, if ever, he charges a jury on the presumption.
B. Restitution and Merchant Fee Reimbursement
The Nebraska bad check statute provides specifically that a con-
victed bad check writer may be sentenced to make restitution and to
reimburse the merchant for his seven dollar cost of filing with the
county attorney. 5 1 I only casually have canvassed Nebraska sentenc-
ing practice in bad check cases, but I believe it safe to assume that
restitution routinely is ordered. No matter how circumscribed the bad
check offense and program, they always will exist in part to aid pri-
vate debt collection efforts. Restitution awards therefore make per-
fect sense. 5 2 Even within broader criminal justice goals, restitution
awards are sensible: they attempt to make the victim whole, an aim
long forgotten by the criminal justice system. 5 3 So long as the crimi-
nal justice process does not invade provinces better (or constitution-
ally) left to civil resolution, I believe restitution awards should be
made and are constitutional even if an indigent defendant is unable to
take advantage of the sentence mitigation possible upon restitution. 5 4
Payment of merchant costs, by statute tied to making restitution,
raises a separate question. It is clear that a criminal justice system
may distinguish between the classes of convicted and acquitted per-
sons in assessing fees and costs without offending constitutional equal
protection guarantees.155 It also is clear that the state may exempt the
acquitted but compel the payment of costs by the convicted so long as
the convicted are treated equally with other judgment creditors re-
151. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-611(6) (Supp. 1985). Restitution, and the repayment of
merchant's fee, may be ordered whether or not there is prison time to be served.
Id. Merchant filing costs also must be repaid by a bad check writer who volunta-
rily makes restitution. Id. at § 28-611(4). A diverted bad check writer must make
restitution, repay the seven dollar filing fee, and pay a $35 class charge.
152. Restitution awards also may be sensible given the nature of the offense, offender,
and the purposes of punishment. For a profile of the bad check writer as com-
pared to other offenders, see F. BEUTEL, supra note 2, at 318-45. For a review of
the traditional elements leading to a sentencing decision, see generally MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF
IMPRISONMENT (1974).
153. See generally Perlman & Potuto, The Uniform Law Commissioners* Model Sen-
tencing and Corrections Act: An Overview, 58 NEB. L. REV. 925, 960-62 (1979).
154. Indeed, the fact of the defendant's indigency might itself mitigate sentence. Moti-
vation for committing a crime is a formal factor in sentencing in many jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 43-12(e)(3) (West 1982). Even without
formal sentencing guidelines, most judges regard motivation as a factor weighing
in the exercise of sentencing discretion. It therefore may be that the defendant
making restitution gets sentence mitigation equal to how he would have been
treated at sentencing had he been indigent.
155. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 49 (1974).
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garding insolvency exemptions. 5 6 It even may be possible to assess
costs against both convicted and acquitted defendants. It definitely is
unconstitutional, however, to assess costs against some but not all sim-
ilarly situated convicted persons. 5 7
The Nebraska statute requires repayment of merchant filing costs
not by all persons convicted of a bad check offense but only by those
ordered to make restitution.1 5 8 At first glance, then, the statute seems
unconstitutionally to treat convicted persons differently as regards fee
repayment. The constitutionality of the Nebraska provision likely
turns on the characterization of the seven dollar fee reimbursement.
The most natural characterization, and one that saves the constitu-
tionality of the provision, is to treat the fee reimbursement simply as
part of the restitution order. When viewed as part of the restitution
order and not as a charge in itself it is obvious that the fee can be
assessed only against those ordered to make restitution. Requiring fee
reimbursement only where restitution is ordered, therefore, is no
more unconstitutional than the judge's decision to order restitution in
the first place.
On the other hand, if the fee is treated as a separate charge, up-
holding the constitutionality of the provision, although still possible, is
much less likely. In Rinaldi v. Yeager,15 9 the Supreme Court found
an equal protection violation in a statutory scheme where transcript
costs after unsuccessful appeal were assessed against not all convicted
persons but only those actually in prison. The Court found tying tran-
script costs to prisoner status demonstrated irrationality "in the na-
ture of the class singled out."1 60 Under the Nebraska statute, by
contrast, tying merchant fee reimbursement to a restitution order (as
contrasted with tying transcript costs to prison status) may well de-
scribe a rational class. In Nebraska, moreover, although only those
ordered to make restitution must reimburse the merchant's seven dol-
lar fee all convicted persons, even those receiving prison terms,161 are
subject to restitution orders. This is somewhat different factually
from Rinaldi, since obviously not all convicted persons in Rinaldi
were subject to prison sentences.
If the seven dollar filing fee repayment scheme is unconstitutional
156. Compare James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (Kansas recoupment statute held
unconstitutional), with Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) (Oregon recoupment
statute with exemptions upheld). The legislative determination to charge costs
only of the convicted meets a test of "objective rationality." Fuller v. Oregon, 417
U.S. 40, 50 (1974).
157. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). Similarly it would be unconstitutional to
assess costs against some but not all acquitted persons.
158. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-611(4), (6) (Supp. 1985).
159. 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
160. Id. at 309.
161. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-611(4), (6) (Supp. 1985).
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under Rinaldi the problem easily could be remedied by requiring that
restitution be ordered in all cases. 162 In any case, this strikes me as
the better policy choice in a bad check offense since otherwise one
could argue that the bad check passer retained the benefit derived
from commission of the offense.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska bad check offense implicates all three branches of
government. And all three branches need to act with greater care in
dealing with the bad check offense. Specifically, the Nebraska uni-
cameral needs to take yet another look at the bad check statute. As
drafted, at least two provisions-the bad check misdemeanor not re-
quiring exchange for value, and the statutory presumption on notice
and failure to pay-are of doubtful constitutionality. They should be
deleted or at least reworked to offer real possibility that they could
sustain constitutional challenge.
As far as the Nebraska Supreme Court is concerned, it needs to
adopt a logically consistent approach to the bad check offense. If the
court thinks that knowledge is a sufficient mens rea under the Ne-
braska Constitution, then it should say so. If it believes that specific
intent, or knowledge plus more (the more being an exchange for
value), is required, then it should act to assure that this requirement is
met in substance and not mere form.
Finally, the county attorney, an officer of the executive branch,
needs to revamp the bad check program and notice advertising it. The
program should include within its net only those who realistically
could be prosecuted for the bad check offense. The store notice should
not threaten what the program legally cannot deliver.
And all three branches need to act with a keen sense of the policy
162. The unequal treatment problem then would arise only upon a reversal of convic-
tion after appeal. Reversal of a conviction requires a finding of clear error that
actually prejudiced the fact-finder's decision. See, e.g., State v. LeBron, 217 Neb.
452, 349 N.W.2d 918 (1985); State v. Lamb, 213 Neb. 498, 330 N.W.2d 462 (1983).
Although more efficient and easier to administer, it would be an irrational classi-
fication to distinguish between those acquitted in the first instance (perhaps be-
cause no trial error occurred to prejudice the fact-finder's decision) and those
whose convictions are reversed on appeal. Obviously, as an aspect of restitution,
the fee is not due (or must be repaid if paid) if the conviction is reversed on ap-
peal. For equal protection purposes it must be returned even if treated as a sepa-
rate charge. Otherwise, as regards the fee, the statute would discriminate
between classes of acquitted persons. Although the statute is not entirely clear, it
appears that merchant fee reimbursement is to be paid at time of sentence (or
before) since the statute directs sentence mitigation for restitution "made" and
costs "paid." NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-611(7) (Supp. 1985). The defendant may have
to wait for reimbursement until after a decision not to retry is made or after a
retrial and acquittal. He may even, as a tradeoff for no retrial, forego his right to
reimbursement of restitution and merchant filing cost.
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underlying their acts. Generally, I suppose, they-and we--disap-
prove of debts voluntarily incurred going unpaid; we would prefer that
no bad check be written and that all bad checks be covered. We need
to remember that there are courts and a civil process available to han-
dle bad check claims. The criminal process, including diversion deci-
sions, should be restricted to those who as a matter of law-defined as
a matter of considered policy-we believe should be called criminals.
Merchants should be left to handle the others, or not, as their business
judgment dictates.
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APPENDIX A
ATTACHED IS A LIST OF YOUR CHECKS REJECTED BY THE BANK
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING CAREFULLY.
1) To dispose of this matter without criminal charges being filed, you must make full
restitution, pay the check collection fee and in addition attend a bad check class (see
attached sheet).
2) The class is mandatory. We will not accept restitution until you have completed the
class. After you have completed the class, you must bring to our office both the
graduation certificate and your restitution for the check(s), plus the collection fee
listed on the enclosure ($7.00 per check).
3) You will have thirty (30) days from the date of this form to take and complete the
class and in addition ten (10) days to make restitution. If after forty (40) days you
have not taken the course and made restitution, a warrant will be issued for your
arrest. If you wait to be arrested, you will be booked into jail and this office will
consider prosecution.
4) Restitution (repayment of the money you owe) may be paid in cash, a cashier's
check, or a money order made payable to County Attorney. It should be in the
amount of the check(s), plus the check collection fee, as authorized by Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 28-611. Neither personal checks nor partial restitution will be accepted.
DO NOT MAKE RESTITUTION TO THE MERCHANT WHO ACCEPTED YOUR
CHECK. THIS MATTER CAN ONLY BE CLEARED UP BY FOLLOWING THE
ABOVE PROCEDURES.
You may appear in person at the Lancaster County Attorney's Office or you may mail
your restitution, fee and certificate to: County Attorney, County-City Buiding, 555
South 10th Street, Lincoln, Nebraska, 68508. Remember, you must complete the bad
check class before we can accept restitution. If you go past your forty (40) days, a war-
rant will be issued for your arrest by the Lancaster County Attorney's Office. A convic-
tion under this type of offense can result in both a fine and a jail sentence.
THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE YOU WILL RECEIVE
NOTE: The Lancaster County Attorney's Office is located at 555 South 10th Street,
Lincoln, Nebraska, on the second floor of the County-City Building.
Sincerely,
Lancaster County Attorney
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APPENDIX B
LANCASTER COUNTY BAD CHECK PROGRAM
Sponsored by National Corrective Training Institute
As part of Lancaster County's new bad check policy, you must attend a bad check
class if you wish to avoid prosecution for your bad checks. To get your charges dropped,
you must: 1) pay full restitution and fees on your bad checks, 2) complete an eight hour
class and 3) pay the cost of the class which is $35.00. You will also have to pay court
costs if a complaint has been filed in County Court.
You have 30 days from the date on the enclosed letter to complete the class. You
must also pay restitution within 10 days after attending the class. You may not pay off
your checks without a graduation certificate from class.
YOU MUST SIGN UP FOR A CLASS WITHIN ONE WEEK FROM THE DATE
ON THE ENCLOSED LETTER OR CHARGES WILL BE FILED IN COURT. YOU
MUST ATTEND THE CLASS YOU HAVE SIGNED UP FOR. RESCHEDULING IS
NOT PERMITTED EXCEPT FOR EMERGENCIES WHICH MUST BE VERIFIED.
Several classes are offered every month, either on Saturdays or on two consecutive
weeknights. Please do the following if you wish to take the class:
1) Call the Lancaster County Pre-Trial Diversion Program, 475-3604, between 8:00
a.m. and 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday to enroll in a class. The people answering
the phone can only sign you up for a class. They cannot excuse you from class or answer
any other questions about your offense.
WHEN YOU CALL, BE SURE TO FIND OUT THE EXACT DATE AND PLACE
OF YOUR CLASS AND WRITE IT DOWN HERE:
YOU MUST BRING THIS LETTER TO CLASS TO SHOW THAT YOU HAVE
SIGNED UP.
A MAP SHOWING THE TWO CLASS SITES IS LOCATED ON THE BACK OF
THIS LETTER.
2) Attend class as scheduled. Bring $35.00 in cash, money order or cashier's check
payable to Lancaster County. You may not pay by personal check or take the class
without paying the fee. If you have a joint checking account and wish your spouse to
attend, he or she may do so at no extra cost.
3) After completing the class, take your graduation certificate with you to the
County Attorney's office, 555 S 10th St, when you pay off your checks. Their hours are
8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday - Friday. You have 10 days to pay off your checks. Pay-
ment will not be accepted without your class certificate.
Saturday classes are from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Registration starts at 8:15 a.m. No
one will be admitted after class has started. You will have one hour for lunch. Evening
classes are held on two consecutive nights from 6:00 to 10:00 p.m. each night. Registra-
tion begins at 5:45 p.m.
Do not wait to take this class. If you have not taken this class within 30 days, a
warrant will be issued for your arrest. Also, do not call the County Attorney's office
about this program. It is mandatory that you attend to avoid charges.
If your number of bad checks were due to an error by your bank, you may avoid
having to take the class if you get a letter from your bank stating it was their fault and
take it to the County Attorney's office before the date of your class.
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APPENDIX C
LANCASTER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
REQUEST FOR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION ON BOGUS CHECK(S)
1. Business/Person turning in check for prosecution:
2. *Business address: .Zip: Phone:
3. Name & position of person completing form:
4. Name & position of person who took check:
4a. Home phone & address of above:
*If for any reason this address changes, let this office know immediately.
5. Name of person who wrote check:
6. Name of person who passed check, if different from above:
7. Address & phone of checkwriter/passer:
7a. Employer of above, if available:
8. Amount of check: Date received:
9. Was check written in presence of person who took check?
10. Can person who took check identify check passer in court?
11. Was check written and passed in Lancaster County?_
12. What was received for this check? (i.e., cash, what type of mdse., etc.):
13. Was check given in payment of an account? Yes_ No_..._ (If yes, explain on
back).
14. Did check passer ask that the check be held or was it post-dated?
15. Driver's license number of checkwriter: #.
16. Other I.D., if shown:
17. Have you taken checks from this individual before?_
18. On what date did you send notice of this check to the passer?
Was this notice returned to you?
19. If contact was made with passer, did he/she identify him/herself to you?
When was this, and what response did you get?
20. Any additional information which may be helpful:
The undersigned states that he/she has filled out this complaint, that the statements
are true and that he/she is willing to testify in Court under oath to the above
statements.
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